Irony in “Top of the Food Chain” by T. Coraghessan Boyle Essay

T. Coraghessan Boyle’s â€Å"On Top of the Food Chain† is more than just a narration of a selfish person’s mistakes. The narrator’s tone is a literary element used to show man’s indifference for organisms that are of no immediate benefit or are a nuisance to them. _†The thing was, we had a little problem with the insects†¦Ã¢â‚¬ _ The narrator’s tone in â€Å"Top of the Food Chain† is quickly shown as self-centered in working for his comforts and indifferent to the havoc his choices make on the environment. Humans believe that we can solve everything that is put upon us, but there is always a catch. In this story, Mother Nature proves us that she can always be ahead of how humans perceive things. From the very first sentence, the narrator is portrayed as a self-serving person. In charge of a group bringing health care to a third-world village, his choices to improve the lives of the villagers lead to wreaking chaos on the local food chain. The improvements start by poisoning the flies. When the geckos that feed off of these flies die due to starvation, the cat population also diminishes. When the cats are gone, the rat population is left unregulated and is allowed to spread disease to the humans and ruin their crops. The narrator’s condescending tone towards these disastrous events is the most significant factor that Boyle uses to develop his theme. The narrator assumes he is at the top of the food chain, and he has no problem killing off the smaller species. However, the narrator is too indifferent to realize that by hurting the lower members of the food chain, he has hurt himself. This is what shows the true irony in the story. The narrator did something that he believes is good for him, but instead it ends up being entirely the opposite of it. The story reflects that humans can do immoral things, without thinking well of the consequences and the effect it is going to have on others. â€Å"Top of the Food Chain† is ironic since Mother Nature got back at all of the selfishness that was portrayed in the story. Global Warming is a great example of how nature can get back to humans because of our own selfish actions. Human activities contribute to climate change by causing changes in Earth’s atmosphere in the amounts of greenhouse gases, aerosols (small particles), and cloudiness. The largest known contribution comes from the burning of fossil fuels, which releases carbon dioxide gas to the atmosphere. The release of carbon dioxide damages the atmosphere, which cause drastic changes in the climate. However, his tone following the severe circumstances that played out in the story implies that he simply does not care about anything other then what he wants. The narrator’s arrogance and belief that he can do what ever he wants without hurting himself reflects his idea that he is Top of the Food Chain. Unfortunately, he learns the hard way that his selfish actions turn around and hurt him in the end, which ends up being ironic. T. Coraghessan Boyle demonstrated us that nature can always get back to humans despite of whatever we do; selfish or unselfish.

Parliamentary sovereignty Essay

Critically discuss this statement. A.V Dicey gives an introduction to the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty as, â€Å"the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament’. However, there are many discussions as to whether the UK joining with the European Union and adherence to the Human Rights Act 1998 renders sovereignty irrelevant. It will be argued that although following these rules may appear to be contradictory to sovereignty, co-operation is entirely voluntary, necessary, and there are many examples as to why sovereignty is not irrelevant, nor archaic. Firstly, Parliamentary sovereignty is not a constitutional relic. It may seem to be the, as part of the UK constitution continues to rely on extremely early Acts such as The Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights Act , however, these statutes continue to remain as they set out important constitutional principles. Even since 1215, it has been recognised that it is important to limit the power of the monarch, and transfer powers to parliament, in interest of balance, and the separation of powers. Up until present day, supporting Dicey’s summary above, UK courts cannot strike down an Act of Parliament, this is unlike many Supreme Courts in other countries, for example the USA, who are bound to reject legislation which contradicts the written constitutional rights. For example in the case of Mortensen v. Peters , it notes that in the event of a contradiction between international law and Act of Parliament, courts within the UK are bound to apply the UK legislation, and discount the international law. This shows that, while Parliamentary sovereignty is based on ancient fundamental principles, it still has a modern, every day importance, which is key to our constitution, as supported by Jennings ; ‘The supremacy of Parliament is the constitution’. The doctrine of legislative sovereignty dictates that  parliament has power to legislate on constitutional matters, thus parliament can change the constitution by an act of parliament. There is a challenge posed to parliamentary sovereignty by EU law, as in 1973 the UK joined the European Union. Member states must not be permitted to deviate from EU rules common to all, thus overriding Parliamentary sovereignty. This seems to conflict with Dicey’s view of sovereignty. The European Communities Act 1972 tries to establish the relationship between domestic law and EU law ; ‘Any enactment passed or to be passed†¦ shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section’. This provides a problem with sovereignty, as it means that the UK will have to adhere to the EU court, rather than our own supreme court. Parliament in the future may no longer be considered as sovereign, as they may no longer be free to make or unmake law. However, courts have tried to find a middle ground with EU and Parliamentary sovereignty, in the case of Macarthys . Lord Denning stats that if Parliament every clearly and deliberately passes an act which is inconsistent with EU law, ‘the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament’. This shows that Parliament has retained some of its independence, and only acts in accord with EU voluntarily, and because the UK agrees with the EU laws. Leading on from the UK’s voluntary cooperation with the EU laws, is the case of Factortame (No. 2) . Justification for the decision in Factortame was offered by Lord Bridge, which emphasised that; â€Å"whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary†; the ECA 1972 was the domestic source of the supremacy of EU law; and there was nothing novel about this decision. Lord Bridges’ speech traces the source of the limit of legislative power to the ECA 1972, suggesting that if Parliament wishes to create a new Act, contradicting EU law, it need only expressly state in the new statute that it is to take place regardless of the ECA 1972. This, supported by Denning’s Obiter in Macarthys , brings us in a compete circle, to Dicey’s view; ‘that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament’, as it suggests that the UK can decide not to follow EU law, therefore Parliamentary sovereignty is not obsolete or irrelevant.

Economic History Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Economic History - Essay Example Some believe that the living standard of the common worker fell during the revolution, while others are of the view that it rose and everyone was better off. This essay will try to review the factors that contributed to the industrial revolution to be adopted first of all by England, rather than by any other European country. Though it is hard to pinpoint, but most historians agree that the Industrial Revolution basically originated in England with a series of social and technological innovations. Between 1760 and 1860, the progress in technology and education and an increasing capital stock, transformed England into the workshop of the world. This transformation came to be known as the Industrial Revolution, which gave rise to the income of not only its people; but as its effects spread, to the rest of the Western world as well. Historians also agree that this revolution was one of the most important historical events, making it possible for a rapid transition to the modern age, but disagree with the different aspects of this event. A question that really interests economic historians is that why did the eighteenth century industrial revolution start in Europe rather than in any other part of the world, like France and China or India. Though numerous factors like ecology, government and culture have been suggested but some historian argue that as China and Europe were similar in the 1700s, the crucial difference which resulted in the Industrial Revolution in Europe were the sources of coal and other raw material near the manufacturing centers. This allowed Europe to economically expand in a way China could not. Some also credit the difference in the belief systems as Europe focuses on the individual, while the Chinese beliefs are centered round relationships between people. Similarly, India was spilt up into many kingdoms, each fighting for supremacy. Its economy was dependent on cotton and agriculture and technological innovations were completely non-existent. The palace treasuries with huge amount of wealth, was easily moved to Britain making it more convenient for England to use it as needed. England also had huge natural financial profits which it gained from its many overseas colonies. Moreover, the aristocracy in continental Europe believed that as compared to the common people, they were born with higher virtues and the pursuit of money was a characteristic of lower class. The capitalistic and mercantile in England as well as the whole of Europe was achieved by the middle or the non-aristocratic classes. 'Why was England First:' According to Crafts (1977) the comparative approach to the two problems posed by the Industrial Revolution are why the breakthrough took place in Western Europe, and within Europe, where and when did it occur. It provides valuable insight into the economical growth from the general perspective and a better understanding of England's economic growth from the aspect of the Industrial Revolution. Crouzet (1967) is also of the view that this comparative approach can be greatly helpful for those economic historians who are particularly interested in the key problem of growth. And by systematically comparing the

EasyJet Strategic Management Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

EasyJet Strategic Management - Essay Example Easyjet has focused on the strategy of being safe and sustainable, in which is a strategy to fulfil the means of the airline staying afloat through all conditions and circumstances that the economy may go through (Easyjet plc, 2011). With this in mind, the company has seen the successful implementation of safety measures, where the company focuses on the wellbeing of the clients and the efficiency of their services to meet the needs and demands of their clients. In addition, the safety applies to the services they provide, where the record they have is one to be envied following a small number of incidences. Though the incidents do not leave a lot to be desired, they have shaped the airline, especially considering its low-cost flights that it offers to clients. With this in mind, their low-cost strategy also calls for sustainability so that the airline becomes a market leader, which has been achieved by a number of things. This is one by having partnerships with other companies to pr ovide towards some of its needs, which include marketing and fuel issues (Parsons, 2011). This can be evidenced by the joining of the airline in Visiting Britain’s marketing partnership, where it seeks to capture a larger market bases as opposed to the one it captured by working on its own marketing strategies, and the sustainability plans focus on generating revenues and expansions that can continue to be there for a long time to come (Johnson, 2011). As such, the sustainability of the revenues and abilities of the company are the main strategies in place to drive the company to a new level and maintain its notch at the top. In addition, the company applies the strategy of keeping the customer first, which couples with the safety and sustainability strategy, in which case the customer takes priority of operations. This is evidenced by the footprint of the airline across Europe where there is a strong presence of the airline going all over Europe, which is the main focus of t he airline. As such, the airline focuses on the clients in that the footprints are a representation of the company’s clients and their destinations. This is coupled with the improvement of the customer’s experience, where in spite of suffering staffing shortages, there have been improved services to attract more customers and meet their travel needs as they travel with them to give value for their money in their low-cost flights (Niththyananthanpara, 2010). Other companies competing against Easyjet in domestic air travel include Jet2, BMI Baby and Ryan Air among others, but with the strategies used by

Uniform Commercial Code, section 1-302 Research Paper

Uniform Commercial Code, section 1-302 - Research Paper Example This is because of the aspect that owing to the prevalence of stern laws and regulations, companies and individuals in the commercial business domain has not been able to work freely and ensure trade and business in the best possible manner. Furthermore, owing to the prevalence of diverse range of rules and regulations regarding business in various states of the US, there was an extreme lack of uniformity and balance in legal structure, which has one way or the other had hindered effective performance of the business units and traders (SBA, â€Å"Uniform Commercial Code†). In order to ensure efficacy and less complexity in the commercial business domain, the government of the nations has emerged with the proposal of formulating a common law and codes of regulations that can be used uniformly in every state of the US, especially in the domain of commercial business. The codes were first published in the year 1952 and where subject to severe criticism in the initial phases owing to some of its policies (Legal Information Institute, â€Å" § 3-312. Lost, Destroyed, Or Stolen Cashiers Check, Tellers Check, Or Certified Check.†). These set of codes were primarily developed with the intention to harmonize the legal structure of the US with regard to sales of goods and services in more than 50 states of the US. It helped in regulating and governing the commercial business sector of the country in the most efficient manner through developing flexible and simple policies that can be adopted commonly by all the states that are associated with commercia l business. The most vital objective of these set of codes is that it govern each and every transaction of the business units within the commercial trading, so that efficient results can be obtained in the eventual stages. With the presence of UCC in the scene, different states within the US have been able to work with utmost efficacy during intra-state business as that the

Elderly as a vulnerable population Research Paper

Elderly as a vulnerable population - Research Paper Example Recent reports such as the Health Ombudsman’s Care and Compassion report and the revelations about care at hospitals in Staffordshire have highlighted shocking examples of failings in NHS and care services. The new guidelines have been produced in collaboration with the Care Quality Commission, ADASS and Royal Colleges of Nurses and GPs as well as frontline staff to develop practical guidance for staff across the NHS. â€Å"This guidance has been developed with staff and stakeholders to ensure they address the day-to-day safeguarding issues facing staff and managers. Small changes like ensuring all staff are aware of the full range of all the safeguarding procedures in place at their organisation can make a real difference to patients.† â€Å"As the professional regulator for nurses and midwives we are committed to strengthening the safeguarding of adults and welcome this new material to further support the professionals who care for them. â€Å"Having contributed to the work of this health advisory group, we are confident these newly published materials will be of interest to a wide range of professionals and will support them in their understanding, practice and decision-making in relation to safeguarding

Who was John Collier, and what role did he play in creating a New Deal Research Paper

Who was John Collier, and what role did he play in creating a New Deal for Native People - Research Paper Example John Collier became commissioner of Indian affairs in 1933 as appointed by President Roosevelt. Under Collier’s governance, federal policies had sweeping and permanent changes in favor of the Indians. One of these federal policies was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which was also known as the â€Å"Indian New Deal† or the â€Å"Wheeler-Howard Act†1. The Indian Reorganization Act under Collier made lasting changes in the federal policy concerning Native Americans. One of these changes is ending the allotment of the tribal land to non-Native Americans. Two other changes include the act encouraging tribes to establish their own self-government and building a loan in order to finance tribe members who are putting up a business2. Prior to and aside from becoming a commissioner of Indian affairs, John Collier was also the executive secretary for the American Indian Defense Association, or AIDA, an organization which he himself founded in 1923, in order to fight for the protection of tribal property and religious freedom of Native Americans. Through the institution of AIDA, Collier was able to recommend doing away with the teaching to Indians of only the cultural values of whites. At the same time, it recommended that that Indian Service must provide the youth and their parents the necessary tools that will help them adapt not only to whites but also to Indians3. John Collier also asked Congress for the repeal of the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887. This particular law pressured American Indian tribes to abolish their own community lands and to have individually owned lands instead. The purpose of this was to promote Indian assimilation into the society of American whites. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, which Collier headed in 1933 provided for the successful passing of the Indian Reorganization Act in Congress4. John Collier’s idea of a â€Å"New Deal† for American Indians during his time definitely was all about the betterment o f this particular group of people. He became commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933 and so helped reform law in favor of the Indians through the Indian Reorganization Act. He was also the founder and executive secretary of the American Indian Defense Association, which issued recommendations on how Indians should be treated and educated. Lastly, he asked Congress to repeal the Dawes Act of 1887 in order to protect the tribal lands of the Indians. Explain French patterns of contact with Native Americans: How did their goals and type of colonization affect the success or failure of relations with Native groups? The French colonizers’ diplomacy and immersion into Native American culture guaranteed the success of their colonization. The French arrived in North America in the 1600s5, and established their colony there. However, unlike the British, who did not respect the natives, the French afforded them with the best treatment as possible. The success of the colonial techniques o f the French that helped them establish New France in Canada was mainly due to their immersion in American Indian culture. The French were very interested in the culture and customs of Native Americans. The French took the time to learn the languages, habits and the ways of the Native American

Peter Singer and Garrett Hardin On Helping the Poor Essay

Peter Singer and Garrett Hardin On Helping the Poor - Essay Example I find that both articles are very well written, and as previously stated, both make their point on their issues, though Singer does so in a more antagonistic, provoking manner, while Hardin seems to remain impartial while giving concrete examples to support his position. After reading these two articles, I find myself disagreeing wholeheartedly with Mr. Singer, on the basis that a nation should look within its own borders and fix the problems that plague it from within before even beginning to give aid to any other countries that may be in need. While I agree that there may be a moral obligation to provide aid and assistance, it should first be provided to those that reside within the borders of a given nation, before being provided elsewhere. Mr. Singer is fixated on a situation occurring in Bengal, while providing general evidence that nations capable of sending aid have not done enough to help. However, he fails to provide concrete, quantitative statistics on the nations that he is citing as able to provide aid to Bengal. There is no concrete evidence given to suggest what is happening within the nations that are able to provide aid, and no other examples other than criticism of those nations who choose to build luxury items rather than send aid. For example, Mr. Singer states that â€Å"Australia’s aid amounts to less than one-twelfth the cost of the Sydney’s new opera house.† He further states that Britain, another country able to give aid to Bengal, has â€Å"non-recoverable costs of the Anglo-French Concorde Project already in excess of ?275,000,000.† Yet he does not mention the per capita statistics of these two countries specifically, citing only that â€Å"they are able to give aid†. Mr. Singer also fails to mention that most large projects such as the opera house and transport systems are, inevitably, taxpayer funded over a long period of time. This in and of itself creates a vicious cycle which, again, Mr. Singer does not mention: higher taxes means less money in the pockets of the citizens, which means less to give to others. It seems as though Mr. Singer is trying to make people feel guilty for having luxuries while there are others that do not, which is hardly the basis for any moral argument that one should give money. Mr. Hardin, in fact, says this in another, perhaps more realistic way by stating â€Å"Some say they feel guilty about their good luck. My reply is simple: Get out and yield your place to others.† Just because one has the resources to share, does not mean that they should. It should be the choice of each and every person and/or country if they choose to share, or if they choose to use that money where it is most needed, which may well be within the borders of their own country. Another issue to look at is the fund that is being donated to. Mr. Singer mentions the Bengal Relief Fund. What proof do people have that the Bengal Relief Fund will actually get the money to actually assist others? In 2001, the World Food Program received notice that one million people in Zimbabwe would be â€Å"in urgent need of food aid within a month†; however, the government, after â€Å"holding out the begging bowl†, refused to allow anyone but themselves to distribute that food (LoBaido). The World Food Program would have no way of knowing if the goods that were donated actually made it to the people in need of aid, or

Most human behaviour and most of our decisions are rational. Discuss Essay

Most human behaviour and most of our decisions are rational. Discuss - Essay Example The latter is viewed as being a model that is extremely descriptive (Newell & Lagnado & Shanks, 2007. 33). Rational intently, is the word that describes people who engage in decision making. It must be known that at the same time, human beings are adaptive and goal oriented in all their actions. The factors, which often make them not make decisions that are rational, are emotional architecture and human cognitive. The latter is often experienced when human beings are in a situation whereby, they have to make decisions, which are extremely important. Many people make irrational decisions when under duress. It is important to avoid making irrational decisions during such times but to maintain calm until such a point that rational decisions is practical. Anger management is an important tool in decision making for it ensures rational rather than irrational decisions are made. Politics is an area where people have to constantly make decisions, which are rational. This is in accordance to a model that is utility classic expected. Evidence that supports this model is of a scientific nature. It has been proven through research, that decisions which are rational are not always possible. A person’s environment plays an essential role in determining whether people make decisions that are rational (Hastie & Dawes, 2001. 42). There is a misconception, which exists between the decision maker responsible for making choices and the environment where decision making occurs. A factor, which may take the form of incentives, can either be negative or positive and it affects decision making. The existence of techniques that are statistical as well as standardized, enable people to distinguish between factors, which are random, and those that are systematic. In turn, it is possible for rationality to be present in making decisions. According to Jonathan Baron (2008. 65), when people are

Interview with the first gentleman Essay Example for Free

Interview with the first gentleman Essay MANILA -My news editor asked me to interview the husband of the highest official of the land, Mr. Miguel â€Å"Mike† Arroyo. On the day appointed, I was whisked in to the Malacanang palace, where after the formalities, i. e. , being frisked by presidential guards in combat fatigues, I was shown in to the Philippines’ equivalent of the Oval Office. Mr. Arroyo rose to shake my hand. He was not tall, but immense, very fat, and had a bored air about him. With him was an old man wearing glasses, who introduced himself as Jess Santos, a lawyer and the First Gentleman’s spokesperson. The interview went on as follows: Q: I hear you’ve been busy these days, filing libel cases against some journalists. Jess: Yes, that is correct. You know these newspaper guys, they’re a pain in the ass. Always noisy. But of course you can’t help it. We live in a democracy, and the Philippines is the most democratic in Asia. I hope you’ll agree. But when they attack the First Gentleman, using all kinds of defamatory imputation, using the media to spread these lies and calumniate and slur him so as to blemish his clean and untainted reputation, he has to fight back. And there’s nothing wrong in using the courts to seek justice. (The First Gentleman nods gravely.) Q: Are there any truths to these so-called lies against the First Gentleman? Jess: Oh, no! None at all. This allegation about unexplained wealth, it’s absurd. It isn’t wrong to be rich, you know. But the main point here, which you must not miss, and should be emphasized in your column or whatever, is that Mr. Arroyo is a gentleman. I mean, a gentleman in the real sense of the word. You don’t see a gentleman everyday, do you? He is very dignified, punctilious of honor, the epitome of chivalry, gallantry, and respect. (The First Gentleman nods, dozing off. ) Q: Is it true he dared the lawyer of a defendant to a fistfight in court? (The First Gentleman opens his eyes, looks at me, but says nothing. ) Jess: Well, you know how it is with honorable men like the First Gentleman. They are very sensitive when their honor is brought to ridicule. And in order to preserve his honor and integrity, it is but normal for the First Gentleman to react in his defense by calling the offending party to a fight, which shows that the First Gentleman is not a pushover, nor is he a weakling, but a chivalrous man like the knights of old who were not afraid to do battle to defend their honor. Q: I see. What about his rumored liaison with a pretty woman, allegedly his secretary? Jess: (assuming a pained expression): Please, please, do not dignify such baseless, malicious accusations. The First Gentleman would never enter into an unchaste relationship with a woman other than his wife, the President, because a true gentleman will never entertain any immoral thought, much more an illicit affair with a woman. (The First Gentleman looks at the ceiling as if remembering something. ) Q: According to a columnist, the First Gentleman stayed in a $20,000 suite at Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas when he went there to watch the fight between your Manny Pacquiao and Erik Morales. Jess: That is not true. I doubt if you can find such a room in Las Vegas. And even if he did, the expenses may have been paid by friends. You know the First Gentleman, he has friends from high places. Q: Well, I admit I don’t know him that much. And I notice he isn’t saying anything. Can I interview him? Jess: Oh, sure. There’s nothing to worry about him. He is the perfect gentleman. Q: Well, sir, could you react to the accusation that you have a secret bank account in Germany? FG: (unsmiling)Who told you that? Q: Well, it’s on the papers, sir. Just trying to get your reaction firsthand. FG: Well, um, it’s a lot of shit, I mean, whoever wrote that article is an asshole, I mean, he must be an enemy of the state to say such matters. Why, I know, being the First Gentleman, that there are continuing threats to our national security. Q: I also hear this issue was brought up by a certain Congressman Cayetano who is now running for Senator. And this person has challenged you to issue a waiver so that he could prove who’s telling the truth. FG: (scowling). The worthless scumbag! Scoundrel! Bloody fool! Pardon me, but I can’t help myself. You see, this person has been using his parliamentary immunity to attack me at every turn. I’m sick of him. But I won’t be dragged into this controversy. Q: He also says you brought 50 million pesos in a helicopter in Mindanao to buy votes in the last election where your wife won as President. FG: That is a lie! Don’t believe the goddam son of a gun! Q: And he has just issued a public statement that he is daring you to engage him in a debate at Plaza Miranda to show who is telling the truth. FG: The nerve! I will not stoop down to his level. If he wants, I challenge him to a fistfight (rolls up his sleeves). Q: He also says you are crook and a liar and an adulterer. FG: (roaring). He said that? Tell him to just wait. Tomorrow I’ll file twenty counts of libel against him. I have fifty lawyers to work on that. Jess: Now there, there, please don’t get excited. A gentleman is never riled up. FG: Tell him I will get his goddam ass! Jess: Please sir, you’re a real gentleman. FG: I know that, I know. And I’ll prove to the #@! =* guy that I’m a *^%4# man of honor! (end of interview).

Example Essay on Professional and Ethical Practice in Nursing

Example Essay on Professional and Ethical Practice in Nursing The Royal College of Nursing (RCN, 1981) and the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC, 2004; 2008) described the word accountability as ones responsibility to somebody or for something, in this case nurses are accountable to the patients, the employers and the NMC principles. Responsibility is being accountable for ones action or omission to patients in our care. Whereas Sempre Cable argued that responsibility relates to ones accountability to what one does and accountability is one responsible to the consequence of what one does (2003). Nurses are accountable to the NMC which legislates and regulates all nurses, midwives and specialist community nurses in the United Kingdom and it is the responsible of all registrant to abide to its principle. Therefore, the author will weave the tapestry of this essay to demonstrate that the NMC (2008) guidance may appear simple but it is a difficult responsibility to fulfil by nurses in practice. As the guideline relates to the first paragraph of t he principles of The Code, firstly, trust in relation to caring of patients health and wellbeing will be defined and the discussion will posit around the kind of treatment received by patients as individuals without discrimination, and respecting their dignity and be an advocate for them whilst they are in the nursing care. Secondly, respecting their right to confidentiality as is of paramount importance and it is enshrined in the Data Protection Act (1998) and also the Human Right Act (1998) which makes it legal. Confidentiality will be defined and note that patients information cannot be disclosed without the patients consent. Thirdly, for nurses to respect the dignity of patients, to advocate for them and respect their confidentiality nurses must be able to use therapeutic communications to get the necessary information and nurses must be able to communicate with other health professionals to support the patients in their care. Nurses must be able to communicate with the patient in a language that is understood by the patient. Fourthly, the principle of ethics in the discharging of the roles of nurses is important to complete the jigsaw of this complex essay. Lastly, to bring theory into practice by using the five steps of nursing process model (Christensen and Kenney, 1990, 1995; Roper, Logan Tierney, 1976; Pearson et al, 2005) will be explained by using the framework of the Clinical Governance (Department of Health (DH), 1999) as the benchmark for quality practice to explain the reason that it is a difficult responsibility for nurses to balance the different agendas. Hence, before an attempt is made to answer the topic of this essay theory of nursing is explained and the definition of nursing is postulate for the reader to understand the direction that this topic will be taken. Theory provides a template for practice as it provides the embodiment of nursing philosophies, presenting the beliefs, understandings, and purposes of nursing. It also guides research and education. A theory helps the understanding of nursing by the general public (Seedhouse, 1986). Theory is also a thinking process especially when a nurse is reflecting on the nursing process (assessment, diagnosis, planning, implementation and evaluation) of a patient (Bell Duffy, 2008). Peplau (1952) argued that nurses use therapeutic communication as a way to tease out information from the patients in order that nurses gain the patients trust and they are treated with respect and dignity. (, patients most of the time are seeing the nurse for the first time,) Orems (1971) used the self- care model where he stated that nurses used the continuous self-care action to care for patients when the patients self-care exceeds their own abilities to meet their needs (self-care deficit). Though Horan et al, (2004); Rogers (1970, 1980), Neuman (1980) and Parse (1987) stated that nursing is both an art and science whereby the main aim is to help patient to achieve biological system homeostasis equilibrium after an illness and to sustain their health and wellbeing not forgetting their respect and dignity. RCN stated that the use of clinical judgement in the provision of care to enable people to improve, maintain, or recover health, to cope with health problems, and to achieve the best possible quality of life, whatever the disease or disability, until death (RCN, 2003 pg 3). Health and wellbeing, respect patients dignity The World Health Organisation (WHO) stated that health is a human state of biopsychosocial wellbeing in the absence of illness. Seedhouse (1995) argued that the WHO definition is too broad and difficult to achieve and it does not take into consideration the different definition of illness. Roper et al (2000) argued that health is an important factor in the model for nursing. Therefore, one of the roles of nursing is not only caring for ill patients but the healthy clients especially when doing health promotion. Furthermore, patients must be treated as individuals and their dignity respected irrespective of whatever cultural and ethnical background, gender, age, sexual orientation and physical and or mental abilities or disabilities they should not be discriminated against. Peplau (1952) stated that therapeutic communication is a vital aspect of health care and it enables nurses to form a partnership with patients and it is central to their quality of care thereby their quick recovery . In communicating with the patients nurses are able to gain insight into patients personal details that they would not normally tell to another person thereby a trust is constructed. As a result of the trust then the nurses and patients relationship is born and it is through respect. Dignity of the patients is paramount for that respect to be fostered further. Nurses should bargain with the patients to identify their preferences regarding care and respecting these within the limits of the professional practice. Fern (2007) noted that a patient may become aggressive especially after post-operative procedure as a novice nurse are into the nursing goal might be able to note vital signs that the patient is in distress than an experience of the nurse will. Gallagher and Seedhouse (2002) argued that patient may feel undignified if they are not communicate to properly, embarrassed and degraded. Nurses are accountable for any actions or omissions if they do not respect the dignity of patients (NMC, 2008; Woolrich, 2008; Burnard, 1997). The NMC (2008) principles clearly state that and it is further reinforced by different National Health Service (NHS) policies such NHS Plan DH, 2000 which has increased the role of nurses without increasing the number of nurses employed. This it itself is causing more complaints among the. Dignity in Care (DH, 2006) Cultural diversity can cause problem (Baillie et al, 2009) Caring for different cultural can be problematic since on a ward that might be patients from different ethnic background and one have to be mindful of their preferences () Maintaining the dignity of patients is not always easy as each patient has their own agenda and sometimes being sick make people behave abnormally. Patient must be treated kindly and considerately. Nurses should act as an advocate for those in their care by helping them to access relevant health and social care information and to support them. Confidentiality and its responsibility for nurses and patients Patients right to confidentiality is of paramount importance and is enshrined in the Data Protection Act (1998), furthermore, it is in the Human Right Act (1998) which sets the right of an individual. Confidentiality is defined as . Any employee of the NHS has the confidentiality guidelines written in their contract of employment irrespective of what type of job the employee is doing. The employers have a safeguard of confidentiality written in each staff employed in the NHS Ethics and its moral dilemma when caring for patients health and wellbeing Ethics are standards of behaviour which nurses are expected to act on when caring for patients and others (Tschudin, 1986; Edwards, 1996; Holland et al, 2008; Kozier et al, 2008) whereas moral is ones personal standard of the difference between right and wrong in conduct, character and attitude. Ethics are found in the NMC Code of conduct and nurses are accountable for their ethical conduct (Kozier, 2008). Ethics and moral are sometimes used interchangeably in some literatures. Beauchamp Childress (1989, 2009) developed a framework stated that there are four moral principles that nurses can work under. They are autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice as explained below. Autonomy states that a patient is an individual and his/her wishes should be respected eventhough the decision runs contrary to our own ethical issues. Nonmaleficence the patient should not be placed do no harm it could happen intentionally, placing someone at harm risk or unintentionally causing harm. Beneficence doing good implement actions that benefit patient and their supports person. Justice fairness justifying one action against another action. (Nursing theorists may say when a nurse in faced with a dilemma the decision should be based on two ethical models utilitarianism one that brings the most good and the least harm for the greatest number of people or deontological theory action is not judged on its consequences but is judged on whether it agrees with moral principles) Ethics can sometimes provide moral dilemmas that nurses face when caring for a patient especially if the patient has been diagnosed with an incurable disease whereby the family and their employer do not want it to be disclosed to the patient. In such circumstances the conflict it between ethics and moral dilemma that is enshrined in the NMC (2008) Code of Ethics their role as nurses and moral duty to the patient who wants to know the truth and the patients health and wellbeing (Benjamin Curtis, 1992; Edwards, 1996). Thompson et al (2006) stated that ethics and moral cannot work in a vacuum further added that in order to justify moral judgement nurses need prior knowledge of ethical theory. Beauchamp and Childress (2009) added that one needs understanding of moral theory to be able to justify ethical decisions. This demonstrates the extra burden imposed on nurses thereby finding themselves constrained by the difficult responsibilities placed on them to fulfil the NMC (2008) Code of E thics furthermore those of their employers. (Nurses must have professional accountability and responsibility regardless of how simple or difficult the task may, they are personally accountable for their practice and are answerable for any action and omission committed whilst discharging their role. In this case responsibility refers to the accountability or liability associated with the duties undertaken by nurses). Conclusion Definition of important words Before the essay tapestry is weaved some words definition are given to set the tone whether the NMC (2008) guidance appears simple and/or is it difficult responsibility to fulfil in nursing practice. The Essence of Care (DH, 2003) is an NHS Policy helping health practitioners to take a patient-focused and structured approach to sharing and comparing practice. Trust Bell Duffy suggested that being trustworthy is difficult as patients, peers, managers have different expectations on the definition of trust (2009). Trust is therefore defined as . Wilson argued that public has lost trust in nursing care due to the fact that they expect modern medicine could cure every possible ill and secondly someone has failed to deliver the service they were mandated to deliver (2002). Health and wellbeing health is defined as the absence of illness with complete physical, mental and social wellbeing (World Health Organisation (WHO), 1946; Seedhouse, 1986) and wellbeing being the (suggested) state of perfection (Wilmot, 2003) Dignity is defined as the way an individual perceives and acquires values (privacy, respect and trust), sets standards according to these values and from these standards judges what is acceptable influenced by the individual cultural upbringing (Haddock, 1996; Seedhouse, 2000; DH, 2000; Matiti, 2002; DH, 2004; Matiti et al, 2007). Client/patient Advocacy Griffith Tengnah (2008) stated that NMC codes places both a normative and positive rules on the registrant (Normative rule what a person should do or what they should refrain from doing and positive rule imposes a legal obligation to do or refrain from doing something). Therefore, the NMC codes pull on both the normative and positive rule to underpin a shared set of values as enshrined by the regulatory body. Apply the concept of dignity in delivering care by respecting the patient as an individual The concept of dignity A concept is a label given to an observed phenomenon In the policy documents NHS Plan (Department of Health (DH), 2000) and Standards for Better Health (DH, 2004) DH states that patients would be treated as an individual first and treated with respect and dignity by focusing on their whole health and wellbeing not only their illness. It further added that the nurses would also be treated with respect and dignity. These words are echoed in the NMC (2008) Code though it does not mention the registrant. Apply the concept of dignity Deliver care with dignity Identifying factors that influence and maintain patient dignity Challenges situation/others when patient dignity may be compromised Quality of care and clinical governance cycle Conclusion: To the author who is a novice (Benner, 1984) the NMC guidance may appear to be a difficult responsibility to fulfil in practice but to an expert nurse the process and analysis of data happens on an unconscious level. This is done as the nurse may be able to deconstruct an incident by summoning his cognitive intuition (knowledge, experience) therefore the clinical decisions appears in his/her conscious mind readily formed (Lyneham et al. 2008; 2009). So it reasonable to conclude that regimes of care should actually benefit clients, rather than simply not cause harm. Beauchamp T L, Childress J F. (1989) Principles of biomedical ethics. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beauchamp T L, Childress J F. (2009) Principles of biomedical ethics. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benjamin M, Curtis J. (1992) Ethics in Nursing. 3rd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press Benner P. (1984) From novice to expert: Excellence and power in clinical nursing practice. California: Addison Wesley. Department of Health. (2000) The NHS plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform. London: The Stationery Office. Edwards S D. (1996) Nursing Ethics: A principle-based approach. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. Griffith R, Tengnah C. (2008) Law and professional issues in nursing. Exeter: Learning Matters Ltd. Hinchliff S, Norman S, Schober J. (eds.) (2008) Nursing practice and health care: A foundation text. 5th Ed. London: Hodder Arnold. Holland K, Jenkins J, Solomon J, Whittam S (eds.) (2008) Roper, Logan Tierney Model in Practice. 2nd Ed. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone Elsevier. Horan P, Doran A, Timmina F. (2004) Exploring Orems self-care deficit nursing theory in learning disability nursing: Philosophical parity paper. Learning Disability Practice. 7 (4) 28-37. Kozier B, Erb G, Berman A, Synder S, Lake R, Harvey S. (2008) Fundamentals of Nursing: Concept, process and practice. Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd. Lyneham J, Parkinson C, Denholm C. (2008) Explicating Benners concept of expert practice: intuition in emergency nursing. Journal of Advanced Nursing. 64 (4) 380-387. Lyneham J, Parkinson C, Denholm C. (2009) Expert nursing practice: a mathematical explanation of Benners 5th stage of practice development. Journal of Advance Nursing. 65 (11) 2477-2484. Nursing Midwifery Council (NMC). (2002) Code of professional conduct. London: NMC Nursing Midwifery Council. (2008) The Code: Standards of conduct, performance and ethics for nurses and midwives. London: NMC. Royal College of Nursing (1981) Accountability in nursing. London: RCN. Seedhouse D. (1986) Health: The foundations for achievement. London: Wiley. Seedhouse D. (2000) Practical nursing philosophy: The universal ethical code. New York: Riley. Semple M, Cable S. (2003) The new code of professional conduct. Nursing Standard. 17 (23) 40-48. Thompson I E, Melia K M, Boyd K M, Horsburgh D. (2006) Nursing Ethics. 5th Ed. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone Elsevier. Waights Wilmot S. (2003) Ethics, power and policy: The future of nursing in the NHS. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wilson R. (2002) Where did peoples trust go? Nursing Standard. 17 (2) 24-25.

Comparing Neo of the Matrix and Ender Wiggen of Ender’s Game :: Movie Film Movies Films

Comparing Neo of the Matrix and Ender Wiggen of Ender’s Game From the first moment that we wake up we know that we are awake, but have you ever had a sensation that you are dreaming but you know you are awake? This is the same way Neo felt in his world in the movie the Matrix. Ender Wiggen was in the same situation in the novel Ender’s Game, written by Orson Scott Card. He was living in a place where no one accepted him because he was a third, which means that he belongs to the government for a special purpose. The comparisons of Neo and Ender through their different conflicts made believe, important decision to make and stimulus that people need and the consequences that brings after making decision. The first similarly that Ender and Neo have was that both were put in the world to complete a mission. First, they needed to believe that they were the one to save the world. Neo, in the movie, The Matrix was living in a world where everything seems normal. But he knows that there is something wrong in the world. This is when Morpheus appears. Morpheus, for many years, was searching for the one. He blindly believed that Neo was the one. When Neo knew that his world was not real, he felt that his whole life was living in a dream world. Morpheus was the man that guided Neo, training him and making him believe that he is the one. On the other hand, Ender’s story is very similar. Ender was a young man: independent, strong willed, mentally tough creative and mature. Even though he is only six years old, he is capable of having the ability of leadership. Ender also had a man with no mercy that believed that he was the one. Colonel Graff was Ender’s teacher. He guides, him tra ins him, isolates him from his peers, and drives him to the point of exhaustion. These two men have a conflict that they do not find themselves in their world. They feel that they do not belong in the world that they are living in. Ender is living in a place where the government controls a system that everyone must follow. Ender does not believe that this system was right for the people. He is fighting with his internal and external conflict. His external conflict involves his struggles to overcome the obstacles places in his path, and the internal conflict is the result of the external that affect his emotional life.

Stolen :: essays research papers

Jimmy and Ruby are the most obvious victims in Stolen, but all suffer in their different ways. Discuss The most obvious victims in a tragedy like the Stolen generation are those in whom the pain and suffering endured is visible to all. Jane Harrison’s ‘Stolen’ presents Ruby and Jimmy as the most obvious victims but not necessarily the greatest, as may be naively assumed. The remaining characters, Anne, Shirley and Sandy all suffer huge depths of despair, yet their suffering appears to lessen to some degree in the eyes of the viewer/reader due to their hope, determination and stability which in some ways assist them in attempting to resolve their problems and become reunited with their loved ones. The physical and sexual abuse experienced by Ruby and Jimmy is horrifying and obviously very visible to others. The loss that Ruby and Jimmy suffered was a loss of dignity and to the extent that they were both unable to keep fighting â€Å"I just can’t [fight] no more† or hold on to any hope of reuniting with their families because their pain was too great â€Å"they stuck a knife into me heart† The children were deceived with the hopes of being cared for â€Å"matron said they’re gunna take one of us home† and when they understood the truth they were disheartened and lost in silence â€Å" I promised not to tell† Jimmy and Ruby both led very tragic lives by the closing scene of the play, implying that perhaps they are the greatest sufferers because of their obvious pain. Jimmy the playful young boy has had his heart ripped apart by the hope â€Å"I’m finally gunna meet my mother† of finally reconnecting with his mum and the despair of her death, and takes his own life as a melancholy eccentric prison inmate â€Å"I’m going now, to be with my mother† Unlike Jimmy, Ruby has the chance to be with her family again, â€Å" Sis, we’ve come to take you home† but her mental and emotional state is beyond repair after the damage done to her, â€Å" don’t live in no home anymore† In â€Å"Ruby’s family come to visit† it appears Ruby is inevitably set to live a lonely and disjointed life†¦if she continues to even have the strength or will to live. A victim of loss, like Ruby, Shirley speaks on behalf of both children and mothers who have lost the family because of the ‘welfare’ system.

The Greatest Of These Is Love Essay -- Gods Love for Mankind

"And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love." (1 Corinthians 13:13) No matter how anointed we are in our preaching, teaching, evangelizing, ministering, etc ... there is no greater evidence of our knowledge of God than how we LOVE one another. Love comes from God and everyone who loves has been born of God and knows Him. (1 John 4:7) The indwelling of God's love in us perfects our human character. Without it, we have no foundation on which to build our Christian lives. Love is not just an attribute of God's character ... It IS God! (1 John 4:16) It is the very essence of God's being. In John 13:34-35, we are commanded to love one another. This command is not referring to a physical affection or emotion, but a purposeful, voluntary SPIRITUAL affection; an unselfish concern for the well-being of others whether or not we feel they are deserving of our love. Even our enemies are to receive our love despite their attitude, or behavior toward us. (Luke 6:27-28) For despite our unworthiness, God loved us and made the greatest sacrifice to prove it. God's Love for Mankind "For God so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son, that whoever believes in Him shall not perish but have eternal life." (John 3:16) God loves us so intensely that He purposed His Son to be unmercifully tortured, beaten, scorned, scrutinized and murdered ... all in the name of Love. He has bestowed His perfect love upon us, seeking those who are deemed the most wretched and alienated from Him that they may be saved. His is a redeeming love manifested in mercy and grace, for He cares for and help us when we are in need, and He accepts us and loves us even though we don't deserve it. "But be... ...adulthood, our spouses can turn away from us in anger or frustration, our friends and relatives turn away for a multitude of reasons. But we can rejoice in the fact that there is ONE relationship where we will always find love ... our relationship with God. There is nothing that can separate us from God's love -- His love endureth forever! (Psalms 118) Thanking God: Heavenly Father, we thank You for Your mercy, grace and above all ... Your love. Without it we have no hope ... we have no future ... we have no life! We thank You for Your ability to look beyond our faults, and see our needs. We rejoice in Your mercy, for it has "made us alive with Christ even when we were dead in transgressions"; Your grace, for "it is by grace that we have been saved"; and Your love, for in love You "sent Your one and only Son into the world that we might live through Him."

How Islam responds to Relationships Essay

Introduction Throughout this project, the intention of the information is to answer the question: How does the religion of Islam respond to issues on relationships? All through this Booklet, I have kept in mind to focus on the ideas of Islamic relationships and what this means to a Muslim, in the Islamic definition. In Islam a definition of relationships means marriage, contract, sex, families, children etc. Therefore, if applied to Islam in liaison to the now modern everyday life this would involve issues such as * Men & Women’s Roles in the family * Beliefs about the ethics of Divorce * Beliefs about sexual Relationships * Religious attitude to the use of contraception These are the subjects I will be talking about and looking over at the Islamic perspective on these topics of concern. To portray the view Islam has over these issues I will be using: * The genuine teachings from the word of our God `Allah` himself, doing this through the Qur’an. * Referring to important hadiths (lessons) and quotes from the prophet Mohammed (pbuh) * The message given out today by the most knowledgeable top scholars. These should give a clear message of what, the view on these issues used to be like, how they have progressed and possibly altered over the years, the differences on these matters from today in contrast to when the religion began, and how it is today, right now in Muslim houses and nations across the world. Islamic Marriage Ceremonies Marriage (nikah) is a solemn and sacred social contract between bride and groom. This contract is a strong covenant; `Mithaqun Ghalithun` as expressed in Qur’an 4:21. The marriage contract in Islam is not a sacrament. It is revocable, both parties mutually agree and enter into this contract. Both bride and groom have the liberty to define various terms and conditions of their liking and make them a part of this contract. Mahr The marriage-gift (Mahr) is God’s command. The giving of mahr to the bride by the groom is an essential part of the contract. ‘And give the women (on marriage) their mahr as a (nikah) free gift† (Qur’an 4:4) Mahr is a token commitment of the husband’s responsibility and may be paid in cash, property or movable objects to the bride herself. The amount of mahr is not legally specified, however, moderation according to the existing social norm is recommended. The mahr may be paid immediately to the bride at the time of marriage, or deferred to a later date, or a combination of both. The deferred mahr however, falls due in case of death or divorce. One matrimonial party expresses `ijab` willing consent to enter into marriage and the other party expresses `qubul` acceptance of the responsibility in the assembly of marriage ceremony. The contract is written and signed by the bride and the groom and their two respective witnesses. This written marriage contract (`Aqd-Nikah`) is then announced publicly. Sermon The assembly of nikah is addressed with a marriage sermon (khutba-tun-nikah) by the Muslim officiating the marriage. In marriage societies, customarily, a state appointed Muslim judge (Qadi) officiates the nikah ceremony and keeps the record of the marriage contract. However any trust worthy practicing Muslim can conduct the nikah ceremony, as Islam does not advocate priesthood. The documents of marriage contract/certificate are filed with the mosque (masjid) and local government for record. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) made it his tradition (sunnah) to have marriage sermon delivered in the assembly to solemnize the marriage. The sermon invites the bride and the groom, as well as the participating guests in the assembly to a life of piety, mutual love, kindness, and social responsibility. The Khutbah-tun-Nikah begins with the praise of Allah. His help and guidance is sought. The Muslim confession of faith that ‘There is none worthy of worship except Allah and Muhammad is His servant and messenger† is declared. The three Qur’anic verses (Qur’an 4:1, 3:102, 33:70-71) and one Prophetic saying (hadith) form the main text of the marriage. This hadith is: ‘By Allah! Among all of you I am the most God-fearing, and among you all, I am the foremost held responsible to save myself from the wrath of Allah, yet my state is that I observe prayer and sleep too. I observe fast and suspend observing them; I marry woman also. And he who turns away from my Sunnah has no relation with me†. The Muslim officiating the marriage ceremony concludes the ceremony with prayer (Dua) for bride, groom, their respective families, the local Muslim community, and the Muslim community at large (Ummah) Marriage (nikah) is considered as an act of worship (Ibadah). It is honourable to conduct it in a Mosque keeping the ceremony simple. The marriage ceremony is a social as well as a religious activity. Islam advocates simplicity in ceremonies and celebrations. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) considered simple weddings the best weddings: ‘The best wedding is that upon which the least trouble and expense is bestowed†. Primary Requirements 1) Mutual agreement (Ijab-O-Qubul) by the bride and the groom. 2) Two adult and sane witnesses. 3) Mahr (marriage-gift) to be paid by the groom to the bride either immediately (muajjal) or deferred (muakhkhar), or a combination of both. Secondary Requirements 1) Legal guardian (wakeel) representing the bride. 2) Written marriage contract (â€Å"Aqd-Nikah) signed by the bride and the groom and witnesses by two adult and sane witnesses. 3) Qadi (State appointed Muslim judge) or Ma’zoon (a responsible person officiating the marriage ceremony) 4) Khutba-tun-Nikah to solemnize the marriage. The Marriage Banquet (Walima) After the consummation of the marriage, the groom holds a banquet called a walima. The relatives, neighbours, and friends are invited in order to make them aware of the marriage. Both rich and poor of the family and community are invited to the marriage feasts. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: ‘The worst of the feasts are those marriage feasts to which the rich are invited and the poor are left out†. (Mishkat) It is recommended that Muslims attend marriage ceremonies and marriage feasts upon invitation. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: â€Å"†¦and he who refuses to accept an invitation to a marriage feast, verily disobeys Allah and His Prophet†. (Ahmad & Abu Dawood) Roles of Men and Women within an Islamic Family Islam teaches that men and women are equal and that Allah will judge them equally according to the way in which they have lived. Men and women are quite obviously different from each other and each have their own qualities, both of these joined together in the act of marriage is what makes a family work well. Due to the differences and qualities, men and women have different responsibilities to their children and to each other. These responsibilities are in no terms biased against women, the responsibilities laid upon the parents are balanced and equally as important to one another. Men do have the quality of normally being physically and mentally stronger than women, and for this, they are expected to provide his wife(s) with sufficient money to allow her to buy food, take care of the house and look after the children. But this does not mean that the father just has a financial role, not at all, the father is the leader of the home in Islam, it is his responsibility to set the social and emotional nature for the home and family. Men’s responsibility in Islam goes far beyond only financial. If the father is emotionally distant, perpetually angry, or closed off, chances are this will reflect throughout the rest of the family. Thus, the role of the father and husband as a â€Å"tone-setter† is a key element in the leadership & running of the household. I notice in my own home that when my father is engaged in reading/activities, I will take interest and want to join him. Rather than get upset at me for interrupting him, he will usually try to include me in what he is doing in a way that is playful and educational. This allows me to take an interest in it as well, increasing the bond and emotional connection between us. Islam gives fathers and mothers a great deal of responsibility for raising their children. It was narrated that ‘Abd-Allaah ibn ‘Umar heard the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) say, â€Å"Each of you is a shepherd and is responsible for his flock. The leader is a shepherd and is responsible for his flock. The man is the shepherd of his family and he is responsible for his flock. The woman is the shepherd of her husband’s household and is responsible for her flock. The servant is a shepherd of his master’s wealth and is responsible for his flock.† He said, I heard this from the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). Women are expected to cook food, clean the house, and take care of the children but the fathers do also have a part in the upbringing of the children and the daily house chores as Mohammed (pbuh) used to help his wife Khadija at the housework as well. Also equal rights are given to both the women and men in Islam; Women do have the right to study if they which, to refuse a marriage, to divorce, to inheritance, to keep their own names, to own property, to take part in politics, whether they are married or not. Women are owed more respect in Islam than men and the pathway to heaven is at your mother’s feet. Muslim Beliefs about the Ethics of Divorce Muslim marriage is supported by Islam and is classified as a very good act between a man and women however Muslims are not so ignorant to think that marriages don’t fail. They do, it is acknowledged that they do, and since marriage is a legal contract between two people and if the continuation of a marriage brings misery to the couple and their children, it can be undone. In a hadith it states; `If a wife fears cruelty or desertion on her husbands part, there is no blame on the, if they arrange an amicable settlement between themselves; and such settlement is best; even though men’s souls are swayed by greed` Also it is said that of all things allowed in Islam but disliked (this is known as `makrooh` e.g. smoking) Divorce is the most hated of them all. A man cannot seek to have a divorce from his wife until it is certain that she is not pregnant, as they may change their mind and try and give it another go if the woman is pregnant. Also as divorce is much hated and is not to be done lightly at all, once divorce has been announced there is a period of three months called `iddah` this is a period of three months to allow for a possible reconciliation of the marriage. If there is no reconciliation then the divorce is permitted to take place. A woman is also allowed to have a divorce, either by an agreement with her husband or because of his treatment of her. Children are regarded as illegitimate if their parents are not married and, according to Shari’ah law, the father has no legal responsibility. These are the complete conditions of marriage in the contract and the circumstances in which it is permitted, backed up by quotes from the Qur’an. Requirements; * Marriage implies that both husband and wife are able to live with one another with kindness, respect and cooperation. It is their responsibility to raise a family and it is a covenant binding on both parties. * There are times when marriages fail and no solution can be found except divorce. * The Qur’an orders men to either live with their wives on good terms or divorce them, but they are not to hold them hostage: â€Å"When you divorce a woman and they are about to fulfill their Idda, either take them back on equitable terms or set them free, but do not take them back to injure them.† Chapter 2, verse 231. * A woman has the right to seek a divorce from her husband if she feels that their marriage is doomed. â€Å"If you indeed fear that they would be unable to keep the limits ordained by God, there is no blame on either of them if she gives something for her freedom.† Chapter 2, verse 229 Muslim Beliefs about Sexual Relationships In Islam, sexuality is considered part of our identity as human beings. In His creation of humankind, God distinguished us from other animals by giving us reason and will such that we can control behaviour that, in other species, is governed solely by instinct. So, although sexual relations ultimately can result in the reproduction and survival of the human race, an instinctual concept, our capacity for self-control allows us to regulate this behaviour. Also, the mere fact that human beings are the only creatures who engage in sexual relations once they are beyond the physical capacity for reproduction, sets us apart from all other species, which engage in sex for the sole purpose of reproduction. Beyond childbearing, sexual relations assume a prominent role in the overall well being of the marriage. In reading hadith, one is impressed with the Prophet’s ability to discuss all issues including those dealing with human sexuality. The topics range from questions about menstruation to orgasm. He apparently was not embarrassed by such inquiries, but strove to adequately guide and inform the Muslims who asked. Both Qur’an and hadith allude to the nature of sexual relations as a means of attaining mutual satisfaction, closeness and compassion between a wife and husband. â€Å"Permitted to you on the night of the Fasts is the approach to your wives. They are your garments and you are their garments.†(2:187) Adultery Also, Muslims are advised to avoid sexual intercourse during menses so as not to cause discomfort to the woman. It could be said that Islam has a very realistic attitude towards sex and realises that both men and women can be tempted to have a sexual relationship outside of marriage. Sexual activity of any kind is explicitly forbidden and adultery by the husband or the wife is a serious crime. `Nor come night to adultery: for it is a shameful deed and an evil, opening the road to other evils` (surah 17:32) Sex Before Marriage Naturally, attraction between individuals is necessary to initiate a relationship that leads to marriage. But sexual relations can obviously take place between any couple, consenting or not. Because of the far-reaching ramifications of sexual relations outside of marriage, God prohibits Muslims from such behaviour. And because the process that leads to physical attraction and ultimately intimacy is part of human nature, Muslims are advised to behave in a way and avoid circumstances that could potentially result in extra- or pre-marital sex. Modesty in dress and behaviour between women and men figures prominently as a means of exhibiting self-control. Similarly, unmarried couples are admonished against spending time alone in isolated places where they would be more likely to act on their feelings and thus be less inhibited. Homosexuality Human beings are capable of many forms of sexual expression, orientation and identification. The existence of such a variety again is not found in any other species and thus further demonstrates our uniqueness among God’s creations. The potential for behaviour, such as homosexuality, does not mean that its practice is lawful in the eyes of God. Therefore, individuals are expected to control themselves and not act on their desires if such action is contrary to the guidelines of Islam. Homosexuality, like other forms of sexual relations outside of heterosexual marriage, is thus prohibited. In any discussion of prohibited acts follows the question of what happens if they nevertheless occur. The Qur’an and hadith are explicit regarding severe punishment by the State if a person is convicted of such a crime. However, in order for conviction to take place, the individuals must confess or be accused by at least four eyewitnesses of the act of actual intercourse. Obviously, the likelihood of these criteria being met is small which means that most couples who engage in unlawful acts will not be punished by the State. They will then deal with the consequences of their behaviour in this life and will be accountable to God on the Day of Judgement. Only He knows how He ultimately judges. Muslim Beliefs about Contraception Contraception Although Muslims are encouraged to have children, contraception is not prohibited. The method used during the time of the Prophet was `coitus interruptus` (known as ‘azl`) about which several hadith exist. His basic response when asked if such a practice was lawful was that individuals can do as they will, but if God intends for a child to be born, she/he will be born. Some interpreted this to mean that preventing pregnancy is not recommended because childbearing is preferred; yet the act is not specifically prohibited. Also, other hadith stipulate that ‘azl could not be practiced without the wife’s consent as it might interfere with her sexual satisfaction or desire to bear children. The Qur’an does not make any explicit statements about the morality of contraception, but contains statements encouraging procreation. Various interpretations have been set forth over time, and at the time of this writing, discussions on the web can be found easily that take various positions. Early Muslim literature discusses various contraceptive methods, and a study sponsored by the Egyptian government concluded that not only was azl (coitus interruptus) acceptable from a moral standpoint, but any similar method that did not produce sterility was also acceptable. â€Å"It is permissible to use condoms so long as this does not cause any harm and so long as both husband and wife consent to their use, because this is similar to ‘azl (coitus interruptus or â€Å"withdrawal†). But it reduces the sensation of pleasure, which is the right of both partners, and reduces the chance of conception, which is also the right of both partners. Neither one of them is allowed to deprive the other of these rights. And Allaah is the course of strength.† – islamic-paths.org, Sex and Sexuality in Islam – Condoms (2005) [4] By analogy, the methods that exist today as contraceptives are lawful for Muslims to use at their discretion. Basically, it is our position that any method that does not involve pregnancy termination is permissible. Imam al-Ghazzali lists a number of legitimate reasons for practicing contraception, including; * Financial difficulty * Threat to mothers health * Chance of child being born with mental or physical deformities * Emotional or psychological hardship * Already having many children * Preservation of beauty and health. It should be clear from this discussion, that since sexual relations should be confined to marriage, contraception is so limited. It is not considered a means of easing the difficulties associated with sexual relations outside of marriage and should most certainly not be used in this way at all. Conclusion Overall, all in all in my total truthful opinion, I do believe that Islam the true words from Allah does promote marriage among society, does accept that marriages do fail and permits divorce and the use of contraception. I accept that marriage breakages can happen and that they cannot be forbidden as the continuous misery of two people is worse than the split of their marriage so it should be permitted. However I do think that in today’s modern society people are getting married with the thought that they can just divorce if it goes wrong but I believe this is truly wrong! People should seriously contemplate whether or not the time is right for them to get married before they just go into it. Also despite being Muslim myself I feel that the permittance of a man having more than one wife is wrong and unfair on the women themselves, because no matter how fair the man wants to be, he’ll never be able to treat all them with the same fairness. Also I don’t feel that a man is able to truly love more than one woman at the same time, so having more than one fair would make one think that the man doesn’t actually love any of his wives but keeps them for pleasurably reasons only. I also have to disagree with a certain Shari’ah law stating that `Children are regarded as illegitimate if their parents are not married and, according to Shari’ah law, the father has no legal responsibility` I believe this to be unjust as women cannot become pregnant by herself; the man in full knowledge of what he was doing had sex with her, giving him responsibility for any offspring created from it. Also men may very well use this law as a means of taking advantage of women as they will not be held responsible for any children created as a result of it. Apart from those, Islam has a very modern and fair way of looking at relationships, and apart from those mentioned I don’t believe that women are treated unfairly in anyway at all. Bibliography The holy qur’an the companions of the prophet book2 al-nawawi’s 40 hadiths Religion & equality booklet www.islamonline.net www.islam101.com www.bbc.co.uk/gcse/bitesize www.islamicforums.com

Khobar Towers Bombing

The following document will look at the operations that took place in the bombing as well as how they got the money to fund the implementation of the bombing, as well as the association of the terrorist with the governments that funded them. It will also look at how the government of America responded. Introduction Khobar Towers bombing is an attack that was organized by Islamic terrorists and it is said to have taken place in the city of Khobar situated in Saudi Arabia.This is a building that provided housing to the Americans who had come to work in Saudi Arabia. The group that is said to be responsible for the attacks was the Saudi Arabia Hezbollah (Risen et al). The amount of money that was needed to carry out the operation was 1. 2 million dollars (Burrough). They got this money from collaborating with the Iranian government that gave them the gasoline and the explosives that were needed. Al Qaeda is also said to have funded the group to carry out the operations.The members of He zbollah were affiliated with Al Qaeda and the government of Iraq. There was no training that was carried out since the group was already well trained. The government provides the necessary funds for the operations; this is because after the Gulf war, they wanted the Americans to get out of their land. The government of US reacted by evacuating the other Americans that were in the country and moving them in their own country. Investigations were carried out and there were some people who were arrested and charged for the crime.Before the crime the housing complex and its surroundings was under tight security that it could not have been imagined that such attacks would be carried out (CNN). References Bryan Burrough (November 6, 2005). â€Å"‘My FBI': Heroes and Villains†. The New York Times. Retrieved on 2006-06-11. Risen, James, Jane Perlez (June 23, 2001). â€Å"Terrorism and Iran: Washington's Policy Performs a Gingerly Balancing Act†, The New York Times. Both sides decry new Ruby Ridge charges†. CNN (August 21, 1997). Retrieved on 2008-12-11.

Friedrich Von Hayek – Law, Legislation and Liberty

t of e ofj â€Å"cc L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY This is Hayek's major statement of political philosophy. Rejecting Marx, Freud, logical positivism and political egalitarianism, Hayek shows that the naive application of scientific methods to culture and education has been harmful and misleading, creating superstition and error rather than an age of reason and culture. Law, Legislation and Liberty combines all three volumes of Hayek's comprehensive study on the basic principles of the political order of a free society.Rules and Order deals with the basic conceptions necessary for a critical analysis of prevailing theories of justice and of conditions which a constitution securing personal liberty would have to satisfy. The Mirage of Social Justice presents a critical analysis of the theories of utilitarianism, legal positivism and ‘social justice'. The Political Order of a Free People demonstrates that the democratic ideal is in danger of miscarrying due to confusions of egali tarianism and democracy, erroneous assumptions that there can be moral standards without moral discipline, and that tradition can be ignored in proposals for restructuring society.F. A. Hayek became both a Doctor of Law and a Doctor of Political Science at the University of Vienna. He was made the first Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research and in 1931 was appointed to a chair at the London School of Economics. In 1950 he went to the University of Chicago as Professor of Social and Moral Sciences and then became Professor of Economics at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat of Frieburg and Professor Emeritus in 1967. He was also a Fellow of the British Academy and was awarded a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1974. Hayek died in 1992. L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTYA new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER Volume 2 THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE Volume 3 THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE F. A. Hayek Vol. 1 Rul es and Order first published 1973 Vol. 2 The Mirage of Social Justice first published 1976 Vol. 3 The Political Order of a Free People first published 1979 First published in one volume with corrections and revised preface in 1982 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Reprinted 1993, 1998 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE  © F. A. Hayek 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982 Printed and bound in Great Britain by T. l.International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0-415-09868-8 C ONTENTS Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER xv CONSOLIDATED PREFACE INTRODUCTION 8 REASON AND EV OLUTION Construction and evolutionThe tenets of Cartesian rationalism The permanent limitations of our factual knowledge Factual knowledge and science The concurrent evolution of mind and society: the role of rules The false dichotomy of ‘natural' and ‘artificial' The rise of the evolutionary approach The persistence of constructivism in current thought Our anthropomorphic language Reason and abstraction Why the extreme forms of constructivist rationalism regularly lead to a revolt against reason 2 8 9 11 15 17 20 22 24 26 29 31 COSMOS AND TAXIS 35 The concept of order The two sources of order The distinguishing properties of spontaneous orders Spontaneous orders in natureIn society, reliance on spontaneous order both extends and limits our powers of control Spontaneous orders result from their elements obeying certain rules of conduct The spontaneous order of society is made up of individuals and organizations 35 36 38 39 v 41 43 46 C ONTENTS The rules of spon taneous o rders and the rules of organization The terms ‘organism' and ‘organization' 5 55 55 67 THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF LAW 72 Law is older than legislation The lessons of ethology and cultural anthropology The process 0. [ articulation of practices Factual and normative rules Early law The classical and the medieval traditionThe distinctive attributes of law arising from custom and precedent Why grown law requires correction by legislation The origin of legislative bodies Allegiance and sovereignty 4 PRINCIPLES AND EXPEDIENCY Individual aims and collective benefits Freedom can be preserved only by following principles and is destroyed by following expediency The ‘necessities' of policy are generally the consequences of earlier measures The danger ofattaching greater importance to the predictable rather than to the merely possibleconsequences ofour actions Spurious realisln and the required courage to consider utopia The role of the lawyer in political evolutionThe modern d evelopment of law has been guided largely by false economics 3 48 52 72 74 76 78 81 82 85 88 89 91 NOMOS: THE LAW OF LIBERTY 94 The functions of the judge How the task of the judge differs fro In that of the head of an organization The aiJn of jurisdiction is the Inaintenance of an ongoing order of actions ‘Actions towards others' and the protection ofexpectations 94 vi 56 59 61 62 65 97 98 101 C ONTENTS In a dynamic order of actions only some expectations can be protected The maximal coincidence of expectations is achieved by the deli/nitation of protected domains The general problem of the effects of values on factsThe ‘purpose' of law The articulations of the law and the predictability of judicial decisions Thefunction ofthejudge is confined to a spontaneous order Conclusions 6 THESIS: THE LAW OF LEGISLATION Legislation originates from the necessity of establishing rules of organization Law and statute-the enforcement of law and the execution of commands Legislation a nd the theory of the separation of powers The governmental functions of representative asselnblies Private law and public law Constitutional law Financial legislation Administrative law and the police power The ‘In easures , of policyThe transformation of private law into public law by ‘social'legislation The Inental bias ofa legislature preoccupied with governlnent 102 106 110 112 115 118 122 124 124 126 128 129 131 134 136 137 139 141 143 145 NOTES vii C ONTENTS Volume 2 THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 7 GENERAL WELFARE AND PARTICULAR PURPOSES In a free society the general good consists principally in the facilities for the pursuit of unknown purposes The general interest and collective goods Rules and ignorance The significance of abstract rules in a world in which most of the particulars are unknown Will and opinion, ends and values, commands and rules, nd other terminological issues Abstract rules operate as ultimate values because they serve unknown particular ends Th e constructivist fallacy of utilitarianism All valid criticism or improvement of rules of conduct must proceed within a given system of rules ‘Generalization' and the test of universalizabiiity To perform their functions rules must be applied throughout the long run 8 29 THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 31 Justice is an attribute of human conduct Justice and the law Rules of just conduct are generally prohibitions of unjust conduct Not only the rules ofjust conduct, but also the test of their justice, are negativeThe significance of the negative character of the test of injustice The ideology of legal positivism The ‘pure theory of law' 31 34 viii 1 6 8 11 12 15 17 24 27 35 38 42 44 48 C ONTENTS Law and morals The ‘law of nature' Law and sovereignty 9 56 61 ‘SOCIAL' OR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 62 59 The concept of ‘social justice' The conquest of public imagination by ‘social justice' The inapplicability of the concept ofjustice to the results of a spontaneous p rocess The rationale of the economic game in which only the conduct of the players but not the result can be just The alleged necessity of a belief in the justice of rewardsThere is no ‘value to society' The meaning of ‘social' ‘Social justice' and equality ‘Equality of opportunity' ‘Social justice' and freedom under the law The spatial range of ‘social justice' Claims for compensation for distasteful jobs The resentment of the loss of accustomed positions Conclusions APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9 62 65 67 70 73 75 78 80 84 85 88 91 93 96 JUSTICE AND 101 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS lOT HEM ARK E TOR DE R 0 RCA TAL L A X Y The nature of the market order A free society is a pluralistic society without a common hierarchy of ends Though not asingle economy, the Great Society is still held ogether by what vulgarly are called economic relations The aim of policy in a society offree men cannot be a maximum offoreknown results but only an abstract order The game of catalla xy In judging the adaptations to changing circumstances comparisons of the new with the former position are irrelevant ix 107 107 109 112 114 115 120 C ONTENTS Rules of just conduct protect only material domains and not market values The correspondence of expectations is brought about by a disappointment of some expectations Abstract rules of conduct can determine only chances and not particular results Specific comlnands (‘interference') in a catallaxy create isorder and can never be just The aim of law should be to improve equally the chances of all The Good Society is one in which the chances of anyone selected at random are likely to be as great as possible 11 123 124 126 128 129 132 THE DISCIPLINE OF ABSTRACT RULES AND THE EMOTIONS OF THE TRIBAL SOCIETY 133 The pursuit of unattainable goals may prevent the achievement of the possible The causes of the revival of the organizational thinking of the tribe The immoral consequences of morally inspired efforts In the Great Soci ety ‘social justice' becomes a disruptive force From the care of the most unfortunate to the protection f vested interests Attempts to ‘correct' the order of the market lead to its destruction The revolt against the discipline of abstract rules The morals of the open and of the closed society The old conflict between loyalty and justice The small group in the Open Society The importance of voluntary associations 149 150 NOTES 153 x 133 134 135 137 139 142 143 144 147 C ONTENTS Volume 3 THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 12 MAJORITY OPINION AND CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY The progressive disillusionment about democracy Unlimited power the fatal effect of the prevailing form of democracy The true content of the democratic idealThe weakness of an elective assembly with unlimited 3 5 8 powe~ Coalitions of organized interests and the apparatus of para-government Agreement on general rules and on particular measures 13 13 17 THE DIVISION OF DEMOCRATIC POWERS 20 The loss of the or iginal conception of the functions of a legislature Existing representative institutions have been shaped by the needs of government, not of legislation Bodies with powers of specific direction are unsuitedfor law-making The character of existing ‘legislatures' determined by their governmental tasks Party legislation leads to the decay of democratic societyThe constructivistic superstition of sovereignty The requisite division of the powers of represen tative assemblies Democracy or demarchy? xi 20 22 25 27 31 33 35 38 C ONTENTS 14 THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR The double task of government Collective goods The delimitation of the public sector The independent sector Taxation and the size of the public sector Security Government monopoly of services Information and education Other critical issues 15 41 41 43 46 49 51 54 56 60 62 GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE MARKET 65 The advantages of competition do not depend on it being ‘perfect' Competition as a discovery proc edureIf the factual requirements of ‘perfect' competition are absent, it is not possible to makefirms act ‘as if' it existed The achievemen ts of the free market Competition and rationality Size, concentration and power The political aspects of economic power When monopoly becomes harmful The problem of anti-monopoly legislation Not individual, but group selfishness is the chief threat The consequences of a political determination of the incomes of the different groups Organizable and non-organizable interests 16 65 67 70 74 75 77 80 83 85 89 93 96 THE MISCARRIAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: A RECAPITUALATION The miscarriage of the democratic idealA ‘bargaining' democracy The playball of group interests Laws versus directions Laws and arbitrary government Froln unequal treatment to arbitrariness Separation of powers to prevent unlimited governlnent xii 98 98 99 99 100 101 102 104 C ONTENTS 17 105 The wrong turn taken by the development ofrepresentative institutions Th e value of a model of an ideal constitution The basic principles The two representative bodies with distinctive functions Further observations on representation by age groups The governmental assembly The constitutional court The general structure of authority Emergency powers The division offinancial powers 8 A MODEL CONSTITUTION 105 107 109 111 117 119 120 122 124 126 THE CONTAINMENT OF POWER AND THE DETH RONEM ENT OF POL ITICS 128 Lilnited and unlimited power Peace, freedom and justice: the three great negatives Centralization and decentralization The rule of the Inajority versus the rule of laws approved by the majority Moral confusion and the decay of language Democratic procedure and egalitarian objectives ‘State' and ‘society' A game according to rules can never know justice of treatment The para-government of organized interests and the hypertrophy of go vern men t Unlimited democracy and centralizationThe devolution of internal policy to local government The abo lition of the government monopoly of services The dethronement ofpolitics 128 130 132 133 135 137 139 141 143 145 146 147 149 EPILOGUE: THE THREE SOURCES OF HUMAN VALUES 153 The errors of sociobiology The process of cultural evolution The evolution of self-maintaining complex systems The stratification of rules of conduct 153 155 158 159 xiii C ONTENTS Customary rules and economic order The discipline offreedom The re-emergence of suppressed primordial instincts Evolution, tradition and progress The construction of new morals to serve old instincts: A1arxThe destruction ofindispensable values by scientific error: Freud The tables turned 161 163 165 168 169 173 175 177 NOTES I N DE X 0 F AUT H 0 R SCI TED I N VOL U M E S SUBJECT INDEX TO VOLUMES xiv 1-3 1- 3 209 217 C ONSOLIDATED PREFACE TO ONE-VOLUME EDITION At last this work can appear in the form it was intended to take when I started on it nearly twenty years ago. Half way through this period, when a first draft was nearly comple ted, a weakening of my powers, which fortunately proved to be temporary, made me doubt whether I should ever be able to complete it and led me to publish in 1973 a fully completed part of what were to become three eparate volumes. When a year later I found my powers returning I discovered that various circumstances made substantial revisions necessary of even those further parts of the draft which I had thought to be in fairly finished state. As I explained in the preface to the second volume, which appeared in 1976, the chief reason was my dissatisfaction with that central chapter which gave that volume its sub-title The Mirage of Social Justice. This account] had better repeat here: I had devoted to this subject an enormous chapter in which I had tried to show for a large number of instances that what as claimed as demanded by ‘social justice' could not be justice because the underlying consideration (one could hardly call it a principle) was not capable of general applicati on. The point I was then mainly anxious to demonstrate was that people would never be able to agree on what ‘social justice' required, and that any attempt to determine remunerations according to what it was thought was demanded by justice would make the market unworkable. I have now become convinced, however, that the people who habitually employ the phrase simply do not know themselves what they mean by t and just use it as an assertion that a claim is justified ‘without giving a reason for it. In my earlier efforts to criticize the concept I had all the time the feeling that I was hitting into a void and I finally attempted, what in such cases one ought to do in the first xv P REFACE instance, to construct as good a case in support of the ideal of ‘social justice' as was in my power. It was only then that I perceived that the Emperor had no clothes on, that is, that the term ‘social justice' was entirely empty and meaningless. As the boy in Hans Christian Andersen's story, I ‘could not see anything, because there was nothing to be seen. The more I tried to give it a definite meaning the more it fell apart-the intuitive feeling of indignation which we undeniably often experience in particular instances proved incapable of being justified by a general rule such as the conception of justice demands. But to demonstrate that a universally used expression which to many people embodies a quasi-religious belief has no content whatever and serves merely to insinuate that we ought to consent to a demand of some particular group is much more difficult than to show that a conception is wrong.In these circumstances I could not content myself to show that particular attempts to achieve ‘social justice' would not work, but had to explain that the phrase meant nothing at all, and that to employ it was either thoughtless or fraudulent. It is not pleasant to have to argue against a superstition which is held most strongly by men and women who are often regarded as the best in our society, and against a belief that has become almost the new religion of our time (and in which many of the ministers of old religion have found their refuge), and which has become the recognized mark of the good man.But the present universality of that belief proves no more the reality of its object than did the universal belief in witches or the philosopher's stone. Nor does the long history of the conception of distributive justice understood as an attribute of individual conduct (and now often treated as synonymous with ‘social justice') prove that it has any relevance to the positions arising from the market process. I believe indeed that the greatest service I can still render to my fellow men would be if it were in my power to make them ashamed of ever again using that hollow incantation.I felt it my duty at least to try and free them of that incubus which today makes fine sentiments the instruments for the destruction of all va lues of a free civilization-and to try this at the risk of gravely offending many the strength of whose moral feelings I respect. xvi P REFACE The present version of the central chapter of this volume has in consequence of this history in some respects a slightly different character from the rest of the volume which in all essentials was completed six or seven years earlier. There was, on the one hand, nothing I could positively demonstrate but y task was to put the burden of proof squarely on those who employ the term. On the other hand, in re-writing that chapter I no longer had that easy access to adequate library facilities which I had when I prepared the first draft of this volume. I have in consequence not been able in that chapter systematically to take account of the more recent literature on the topics I discussed as I had endeavoured to do in the rest of this volume. In one instance the feeling that I ought to justify my position vis-a-vis a major recent work has also cont ributed to delay the completion of this volume.But after careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that what I might have to say about John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1972) would not assist in the pursuit of my immediate object because the differences between us seemed more verbal than substantial. Though the first impression of readers may be different, Rawls' statement which I quote later in this volume (p. 100) seems to me to show that we agree on what is to me the essential point. Indeed, as I indicate in a note to that passage, it appears to me that Rawls has been widely misunderstood on this central issue.The preface to the third volume, which ultimately appeared in 1979, gives a similar account of the further development that also had better be repeated here: Except for what are now the last two chapters, most of it was in fairly finished form as long ago as the end of 1969 when indifferent health forced me to suspend the efforts to complete it. It was then, indeed , doubt whether I would ever succeed in doing so which made me decide to publish separately as volume 1 the first third of what had been intended to form a single volume, because it was in completely finished form. When I was able to return to ystematic work I discovered, as I have explained in the preface to volume 2, that at least one chapter of the original draft of that part required complete re-writing. Of the last third of the original draft only what was xvii P REFACE intended to be the last chapter (chapter 18) had not been completed at the time when I had discontinued work. But while I believe I have now more or less carried out the original intention, over the long period which has elapsed my ideas have developed further and I was reluctant to send out what inevitably must be my last systematic work without at east indicating in what direction my ideas have been moving. This has had the effect that not only what was meant to be the concluding chapter contains a good deal o f, I hope, improved re-statements of arguments I have developed earlier, but that I found it necessary to add an Epilogue which expresses more directly the general view of moral and political evolution which has guided me in the whole enterprise. I have also inserted as chapter 16 a brief recapitulation of the earlier argument. There were also other causes which have contributed to delay completion. As I had hesitated whether I ought to ublish volume 2 without taking full account of the important work of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972), two new important books in the field have since appeared which, if I were younger, I should feel I must fully digest before completing my own survey of the same kind of problems: Robert Nozik, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974) and Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford, 1975). Rightly or wrongly I finally decided that if I made an effort fully to absorb their argument before concluding my own exposition, I would probably never do this. But I regard it as my duty to tell the younger readers that they cannot fully omprehend the present state of thought on these issues unless they make that effort which I must postpone until I have completed the statement of the conclusions at which I had arrived before I became acquainted with these works. The long period over which the present work has been growing also had the effect that I came to regard it as expedient to change my terminology on some points on which I should warn the reader. It was largely the growth of cybernetics and the related subjects of information and system theory which persuaded me that expression other than those which I habitually used may be more readily comprehensible o the contemporary reader. Though I still like and occasionally use the term ‘spontaneous order', I agree that xviii P REFACE ‘self-generating order' or ‘self-organizing structures' are sometimes more precise and unambiguous and therefore frequently us e them instead of the former term. Similarly, instead of ‘order', in conformity with today's predominant usage, I occasionally now use ‘system'. Also ‘information' is clearly often preferable to where I usually spoke of ‘knowledge', since the former clearly refers to the knowledge of particular facts rather than theoretical knowledge to which plain ‘knowledge' might be thought to refer.Finally, since ‘constructivist' appears to some people still to carry the commendatory connotation derived from the adjective ‘constructive', I felt it advisable, in order clearly to bring out the deprecatory sense in which I use that term (significantly of Russian origin) to employ instead the, I am afraid, still more ugly term ‘constructivistic'. I should perhaps add that I feel some regret that I have not had the courage consistently to employ certain other neologisms I had suggested, such as ‘cosmos', ‘taxis', ‘nomos', ‘thesis ', ‘catallaxy' and ‘demarchy'.But what the exposition has thereby lost in precision it will probably have gained in ready intelligibility. Perhaps I should also again remind the reader that the present work was never intended to give an exhaustive or comprehensive exposition of the basic principles on which a society of free man could be maintained, but was rather meant to fill the gaps which I discovered after I had made an attempt to restate, in The Constitution of Liberty, for the contemporary reader the traditional doctrines of classical liberalism in a form suited to contemporary problems and thinking.It is for this reason a much less complete, much more difficult and personal but, I hope, also more original work than the former. But it is definitely supplementary to and not a substitute for it. To the non-specialist reader I would therefore recommend reading The Constitution of Liberty before he proceeds to the more detailed discussion or particular examination of problems to which I have attempted solutions in these volumes. But they are intended to explain why I still regard what have now long been treated as antiquated beliefs as greatly superior to any alternative octrines which have recently found more favour with the public. The reader will probably gather that the whole work has xix P REFACE been inspired by a growing apprehension about the direction in which the political order of what used to be regarded as the most advanced countries is teuding. The growing conviction, for which the book gives the reasons, that this threatening development towards a totalitarian state is made inevitable by certain deeply entrenched defects of construction of the generally accepted type of ‘democratic' government has forced me to think through alternative arrangements.I would like to repeat here that, though I profoundly believe in the basic principles of democracy as the only effective method which we have yet discovered of making peaceful cha nge possible, and am therefore much alarmed by the evident growing disillusionment about it as a desirable Inelhod of government-much assisted by the increasing abuse of the word to indicate supposed ailns of governmentI am becoming more and more convinced that we are moving towards an impasse from which political leaders will offer to extricate us by desperate means. When the present volume leads up to a proposal of basic lteration of the structure of democratic government, which at this time most people will regard as wholly impractical, this is meant to provide a sort of intellectual stand-by equipment for the time, which may not be far away, when the breakdown of the existing institutions becomes unmistakable and when I hope it may show a way out. It should enable us to preserve what is truly valuable in democracy and at the same time free us of its objectionable features which most people still accept only because they regard them as inevitable. Together with the similar stand- by scheme I have proposed for depriving overnment of the monopolistic powers of control of the supply of money, equally necessary if we are to escape the nightmare of increasingly totalitarian powers, which I have recently outlined in another publication (Denationalisation of Money, 2nd edn, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1978), it proposes what is a possible escape from the fate which threatens us. I shall be content if I have persuaded some people that if the first experiment of freedom we have tried in modern times should prove a failure, it is not because freedom is an impracticable ideal, but because we have tried it the wrong way. xx P REFACEI trust the reader will forgive a certain lack of system and some unnecessary repetitions in an exposition which has been written and re-written over a period of fifteen years, broken by a long period of indifferent health. I am very much aware of this, but if I tried in my eightieth year to recast it all, I shall probably never co mplete the task. The Epilogue I added to that volume before publication indicates that even during the period of restricted activity my ideas have continued to develop imperceptibly more than I was aware before I attempted to sketch my present general view of the whole position in a public lecture.As I said in the concluding words of the present text, it became clear to me that what I said in that Epilogue should not be an Epilogue but a new beginning. I am glad to be able to say now that it has turned out to be such and that that Epilogue has become the outline of a new book of which I have now completed a first draft. There are a few acknowledgments that I ought to repeat here. Some ten years ago Professor Edwin McClellan of the University of Chicago had again, as on earlier occasions, taken great trouble to make my exposition more readable than I myself could have done.I am deeply grateful for his sympathetic efforts but should add, that since even in the early parts the draft on which he has worked has since undergone further change, he must not be held responsible for whatever defects the present version still has. I have however incurred further obligations to Professor Arthur Shenfield of London who has gone through the final text of the third volume and corrected there a variety of substantial as well as stylistic points, and to Mrs Charlotte Cubitt who, in preparing the final copy of that volume, has further polished the text.I am also much indebted to Mrs Cornelia Crawford of Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, who has again applied her proven skill and understanding in preparing the subject index giving references to all three still separately paginated volumes. xxi L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER Intelligent beings may have laws of their own making; but they also have some which they never made. (Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des lois, I, p. i) I NTRODUCTIONThere seems to be only one solution to the problem: that the elite of mankind a cquire a consciousness of the limitation of the human mind, at once simple and profound enough, humble and sublime enough, so that Western civilisation will resign itself to its inevitable disadvantages. G. Ferrero* When Montesquieu and the framers of the American Constitution articulated the conception of a limiting constitution 1 that had grown up in England, they set a pattern which liberal constitutionalism has followed ever since.Their chief aim was to provide institutional safeguards of individual freedom; and the device in which they placed their faith was the separation of powers. In the form in which we know this division of power between the legislature, the judiciary, and the administration, it has not achieved what it was meant to achieve. Governments everywhere have obtained by constitutional means powers which those men had meant to deny them. The first attempt to secure individual liberty by constitutions has evidently failed. Constitutionalism means limited governmen t. But the interpretation given to the traditional formulae of constitutionalism has made it possible to reconcile these with a conception of democracy according to which this is a form of government where the will of the majority on any particular matter is unlimited. 3 As a result it has already been seriously suggested that constitutions are an antiquated survival which have no place in the modern conception of government. 4 And, indeed, what function is served by a constitution which makes omnipotent government possible?Is its function to be merely that governments work smoothly and efficiently, whatever their aims? In these circumstances it seems important to ask what those founders of liberal constitutionalism would do today if, pursuing I NTRODUCTION the aims they did, they could command all the experience we have gained in the meantime. There is much we ought to have learned from the history of the last two hundred years that those men with all their wisdom could not have kn own. To me their aims seem to be as valid as ever.But as their means have proved inadequate, new institutional invention is needed. In another book I have attempted to restate, and hope to have in some measure succeeded in clarifying, the traditional doctrine of liberal constitutionalism. 5 But it was only after I had completed that work that I came to see clearly why those ideals had failed to retain the support of the idealists to whom all the great political movements are due, and to understand what are the governing beliefs of our time which have proved irreconcilable with them.It seems to me now that the reasons for this development were chiefly: the loss of the belief in a justice independent of personal interest; a consequent use of legislation to authorize coercion, not merely to prevent unjust action but to achieve particular results for specific persons or groups; and the fusion in the same representative assemblies of the task of articulating the rules of just conduct wit h that of directing government.What led me to write another book on the same general theme as the earlier one was the recognition that the preservation of a society of free men depends on three fundamental insights which have never been adequately expounded and to which the three main parts of this book are devoted. The first of these is that a selfgenerating or spontaneous order and an organization are distinct, and that their distinctiveness is related to the two different kinds of rules or laws which prevail in them.The second is that what today is generally regarded as ‘social' or distributive justice has meaning only within the second of these kinds of order, the organization; but that it is meaningless in, and wholly incompatible with, that spontaneous order which Adam Smith called ‘the Great Society', and Sir Karl Popper called ‘the Open Society'.The third is that the predominant model of liberal democratic institutions, in which the san1e representative bod y lays down the rules of just conduct and directs government, necessarily leads to a gradual transformation of the spontaneous order of a free society into a totalitarian system conducted in the service of some coalition of organized interests. This development, as I hope to show, is not a necessary consequence of democracy, but an effect only of that particular form of unlimited government vvith which delllocracy has come to be identi2 I NTRODUCTION fied.If I aln right, it would indeed seem that the particular form of representative government which now prevails in the Western world, and vhich many feel they must defend because they nlistakenly regard it as the only possible form of democracy, has an inherent tendency to lead away from the ideals it was intended to serve. It can hardly be denied that, since this type of democracy has come to be accepted, we have been moving away from that ideal of individual liberty of which it had been regarded as the surest safeguard, and are now drifting towards a system â€Å",~hich nobody wanted.Signs are not wanting, however, that unlimited democracy is riding for a fall and that it will go down, not with a bang, but with a whimper. It is already becoming clear that many of the expectations that have been raised can be met only by taking the powers of decision out of the hands of democratic assemblies and entrusting them to the established coalitions of organized interests and their hired experts. Indeed, we are already told that the function of representative bodies has become to ‘mobilize consent', 6 that is, not to express but to manipulate the opinion of those whom they represent.Sooner or later the people will discover that not only are they at the mercy of new vested interests, but that the political machinery of para-government, which has grown up as a necessary consequence of the provision-state, is producing an impasse by preventing society from making those adaptations which in a changing world are requ ired to maintain an existing standard of living, let alone to achieve a rising one. It will probably be some time before people will admit that the institutions they have created have led them into such an impasse. But it is probably not too early to begin thinking about a way out.And the conviction that this will demand some drastic revision of beliefs now generally accepted is what makes me venture here on some institutional invention. If I had known when I published The Constitution of Liberty that I should proceed to the task attempted in the present work, I should have reserved that title for it. I then used the term ‘constitution' in the wide sense in which we use it also to describe the state of fitness of a person. It is only in the present book that I address myself to the question of what constitutional arrangements, in the legal sense, might be most conducive to the preservation of individual freedom.Except for a bare hint which fev readers will have noticed,7 I con fined myself in the earlier book to stating the principles which the existing types of government would have 3 I NTRODUCTION to follow if they wished to preserve freedom. Increasing awareness that the prevailing institutions make this impossible has led me to concentrate more and more on what at first seemed merely an attractive but impracticable idea, until the utopia lost its strangeness and came to appear to me as the only solution of the problem in which the founders of liberal constitutionalism failed.Yet to this problem of constitutional design I turn only in volume 3 of this work. To make a suggestion for a radical departure from established tradition at all plausible required a critical re-examination not only of current beliefs but of the real meaning of some fundamental conceptions to which we still pay lip-service. In fact, I soon discovered that to carry out what I had undertaken would require little less than doing for the twentieth century what Montesquieu had done for the eighteenth.The reader will believe me when I say that in the course of the work I more than once despaired of my ability to come even near the aim I had set myself. I am not speaking here of the fact that Montesquieu was also a great literary genius whom no mere scholar can hope to emulate. I refer rather to the purely intellectual difficulty which is a result of the circumstance that, while for Montesquieu the field which such an undertaking must cover had not yet split into numerous specialisms, it has since become impossible for any man to master even the most important relevant works.Yet, although the problem of an appropriate social order is today studied from the different angles of economics, jurisprudence, political science, sociology, and ethics, the problem is one which can be approached successfully only as a whole. This means that whoever undertakes such a task today cannot claim professional competence in all the fields with which he has to deal, or be acquainted w ith the specialized literature available on all the questions that arise.Nowhere is the baneful effect of the division into specialisms more evident than in the two oldest of these disciplines, economics and law. Those eighteenth-century thinkers to whom we owe the basic conceptions of liberal constitutionalism, David Hume and Adam Smith, no less than Montesquieu, were still concerned with what some of them called the ‘science of legislation', or with principles of policy in the widest sense of this term.One of the main themes of this book will be that the rules of just conduct which the lawyer studies serve a kind of order of the character of which the lawyer is largely ignorant; and that this order is studied chiefly by the economist who in turn is similarly ignorant of the character of 4 I NTRODUCTION the rules of conduct on which the order that he studies rests. The most serious effect of the splitting up among several specialisms of what was once a common field of inquiry , however, is that it has left a no-man's-land, a vague subject sometimes called ‘social philosophy'.Some of the chief disputes within those special disciplines turn, in fact, on differences about questions which are not peculiar to, and are therefore also not systematically examined by, anyone of them, and which are for this reason regarded as ‘philosophical'. This serves often as an excuse for taking tacitly a position which is supposed either not to require or not to be capable of rational justification. Yet these crucial issues on which not only factual interpretations but also political positions wholly depend, are questions which can and must be answered on the basis of fact and logic.They are ‘philosophical' only in the sense that certain widely but erroneously held beliefs are due to the influence of a philosophical tradition which postulates a false answer to questions capable of a definite scientific treatment. In the first chapter of this book I attempt to show that certain widely held scientific as well as political views are dependent on a particular conception of the formation of social institutions, which I shall call ‘constructivist rationalism' -a conception which assumes that all social institutions are, and ought to be, the product of deliberate design.This intellectual tradition can be shown to be false both in its factual and in its normative conclusions, because the existing institutions are not all the product of design, neither would it be possible to make the social order vvholly dependent on design without at the same time greatly restricting the utilization of available knowledge. That erroneous view is closely connected with the equally false conception of the human mind as an entity standing outside the cosmos of nature and society, rather than being itself the product of the same process of evolution to which the institutions of society are due.I have indeed been led to the conviction that not only some of the scientific but also the most important political (or ‘ideological') differences of our time rest ultimately on certain basic philosophical differences between two schools of thought, of which one can be shown to be mistaken. They are both commonly referred to as rationalism, but I shall have to distinguish between them as the evolutionary (or, as Sir Karl Popper calls it, ‘critical') rationalism on the one hand, and the erroneous constructivist (Popper's naIve') rationalism on the other. If the constructivist rationalism 5 I NTRODUCTION can be shovn to be based on factually false assumptions, a whole family of schools of scientific as well as political thought will also be proved erroneous. In the theoretical fields it is particularly legal positivisn1 and the connected belief in the necessity of an unlimited ‘sovereign' pover which stand or fall vith this error.The same is true of utilitarianism, at least in its particularistic or ‘act' variety; also, I am afraid that a not inconsiderable part of what is called ‘sociology' is a direct child of constructivisn1 when it presents its aims as ‘to create the future of mankind' 8 or, as one writer put it, claims ‘that socialism is the logical and inevitable outcome of sociology'. 9 All the totalitarian doctrines, of vhich socialism is merely the noblest and most influential, indeed belong here.They are false, not because of the values on vhich they are based, but because of a misconception of the forces vhich have Inade the Great Society and civilization possible. r-rhe demonstration that the differences between socialists and non-socialists ultimately rest on purely intellectual issues capable of a scientific resolution and not on different judgments of value appears to me one of the most important outcomes of the train of thought pursued in this book.It appears to me also that the same factual error has long appeared to make insoluble the most crucial problem of politi cal organization, namely ho† to limit the ‘popular will' vithout placing another ‘†rill' above it. As soon as ve recognize that the basic order of the Great Society cannot rest entirely on design, and can therefore also not aim at particular foreseeable results, we see that the requirement, as legitilnation of all authority, of a commitment to general principles approved by general opinion, Inay well place effective restrictions on the particular yill of all authority, including that of the Inajority of the rnoment.On these issues vhich vill be my main concern, thought seems to have made little advance since David Hume and Imlnanuel Kant, and in several respects it vill be at the point at which they left off that our analysis will have to resume. It was they who came nearer than anybody has done since to a clear recognition of the status of values as independent and guiding conditions of all rational construction.What I am ultimately concerned with here, alth ough I can deal only vith a small aspect of it, is that destruction of values by scientific error which has increasingly come to seem to me the great tragedy of our time-a tragedy, because the values which scientific error tends to dethrone are the indispensable foundation of all our 6 I NTRODUCTION civilization, including the very scientific efforts which have turned against them.The tendency of constructivism to represent those values which it cannot explain as determined by arbitrary human – decisions, or acts of will, or mere emotions, rather than as the necessary conditions of facts which are taken for granted by its expounders, has done much to shake the foundations of civilization, and of science itself, which also rests on a system of values which cannot be scientifically proved. 7 ONE REASON AND EVOLUTION To relate by whom, and in what connection, the true law of the formation of free states was recognized, and how this iscovery, closely akin to those which, under th e names of development, evolution, and continuity, have given a new and deeper method to other sciences, solved the ancient problem betveen stability and change, and determined the authority of tradition on the progress of thought. Lord Acton* Construction and evolution There are two ways of looking at the pattern of human activities which lead to very different conclusions concerning both its explanation and the possibilities of deliberately altering it. Of these, one is based on conceptions which are demonstrably false, yet are so pleasing to human anity that they have gained great influence and are constantly employed even by people who know that they rest on a fiction, but believe that fiction to be innocuous. The other, although few people will question its basic contentions if they are stated abstractly, leads in some respects to conclusions so unwelcome that few are willing to follow it through to the end. The first gives us a sense of unlimited power to realize our wishes, w hile the second leads to the insight that there are limitations to what we can deliberately bring about, and to the recognition that some of our present hopes are delusions.Yet the effect of allowing ourselves to be deluded by the first view has always been that n1an has actually limited the scope of what he can achieve. For it has always been the recognition of the limits of the possible which has enabled man to make full use of his powers. 1 The first view holds that human institutions will serve human purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes, often also that the fact that an institution exists is evidence of its having been created for a purpose, and always that we R EASON AND EVOLUTION should so re-design society and its institutions that all our actions will be wholly guided by known purposes. To most people these propositions seem almost self-evident and to constitute an attitude alone worthy of a thinking being. Yet the belief underlying them, that we owe all beneficial institutions to design, and that only such design has made or can make them useful for our purposes, is largely false.This view is rooted originally in a deeply ingrained propensity of primitive thought to interpret all regularity to be found in phenomena anthropomorphically, as the result of the design of a thinking mind. But just when man was well on the â€Å"vay to emancipating himself from this naive conception, it was revived by the support of a powerful philosophy with which the aim of freeing the human mind from false prejudices has become closely associated, and which became the dominant conception of the Age of Reason.The other view, which has slowly and gradually advanced since antiquity but for a time was almost entirely overwhelmed by the more glamorous constructivist view, was that that orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual action was not due solely to institutions and practices which had been invente d or designed for that purpose, but was largely due to a process described at first as ‘growth' and later as ‘evolution', a process in which practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or even purely accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen to prevail over others. Since its first systematic development in the eighteenth century this view had to struggle not only against the anthropomorphism of primitive thinking but even more against the reinforcement these naive views had received from the new rationalist philosophy. It was indeed the challenge which this philosophy provided that led to the explicit formulation of the evolutionary view. 2 The tenets of Cartesian rationalism The great thinker from whom the basic ideas of what we shall call constructivist rationalism received their most complete expression was Rene Descartes.But while he refrained from drawing the conclusions from them for social and moral argument s, 3 these were mainly elaborated by his slightly older (but much more long-lived) contemporary, Thomas Hobbes. Although Descartes' immediate concern was to establish criteria for the truth of propositions, these 9 R EASON AND EVOLUTION were inevitably also applied by his follovers to judge the appropriateness and justification of actions. The ‘radical doubt' which made him refuse to accept anything as true which could not be logically derived from explicit premises that were ‘clear and distinct', and therefore beyond possible doubt, deprived of validity all those rules of conduct which could not be justified in this manner. Although Descartes himself could escape the consequences by scribing such rules of conduct to the design of an omniscient deity, for those among his followers to whom this no longer seemed an adequate explanation the acceptance of anything which was based merely on tradition and could not be fully justified on rational grounds appeared as an irration al superstition. The rejection as ‘mere opinion' of all that could not be demonstrated to be true by his criteria became the dominant characteristic of the movement which he started. Since for Descartes reason was defined as logical deduction from explicit premises, rational action also came to mean only such action as was determined entirely by known and demonstrable truth. It is almost an inevitable step from this to the conclusion that only what is true in this sense can lead to successful action, and that therefore everything to which man owes his achievements is a product of his reasoning thus conceived.Institutions and practices which have not been designed in this n1anner can be beneficial only by accident. Such became the characteristic attitude of Cartesian constructivism with its contempt for tradition, custom, and history in general. Man's reason alone should enable him to construct society anew. 4 This ‘rationalist' approach, however, meant in effect a relaps e into earlier, anthropomorphic modes of thinking. It produced a reneved propensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or design. Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and the market, were thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, or at least as owing whatever perfection they possessed to such design.This intentionalist or pragmatic 5 account of history found its fullest expression in the conception of the formation of society by a social contract, first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct follover of Descartes. 6 Even though their theory was not alvvays meant as a historical account of what actually happened, it was always meant to provide a guideline for deciding whether or not existing institutions were to be approved as rational. 10 R EASON AND EVOLUTION I t is to this philosophical conception that we owe the preference which prevails to the present day for everything that is done ‘consciously' or ‘deliberately', and from it the terms ‘irrational' or ‘non-rational' derive the derogatory meaning they now have.Because of this the earlier presumption in favour of traditional or established institutions and usages became a presumption against them, and ‘opinion' came to be thought of as ‘mere' opinionsomething not demonstrable or decidable by reason and therefore not to be accepted as a valid ground for decision. Yet the basic assumption underlying the belief that man has achieved n1astery of his surroundings mainly through his capacity for logical deduction from explicit premises is factually false, and any attempt to confine his actions to what could thus be justified would deprive him of many of the most effective means to success that have been available to him. It is simply not true that our actions owe their effectiveness solely or chiefly to knowledge which we can state in vords and vhich can therefore constitute the exp licit premises of a syllogism.Many of the institutions of society which are indispensable conditions for the successful pursuit of our conscious aims are in fact the result of customs, habits or practices which have been neither invented nor are observed with any such purpose in view. We live in a society in which we can successfully orientate ourselves, and in which our actions have a good chance of achieving their aims, not only because our fellows are governed by known aims or known connections between means and ends, but because they are also confined by rules whose purpose or origin we often do not know and of whose very existence we are often not aware. Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one. And he is successful not because he knows why he ought to observe the rules vhich he does observe, or is even capable of stating all these rules in vords, but because his thinking and acting are governed by rules which have by a process of selection been evolved i n the society in which he lives, and vhich are thus the product of the experience of generations. The permanent limitations of our factual knowledge The constructivist approach leads to false conclusions because man's actions are largely successful, not merely in the primitive stage but perhaps even more so in civilization, because they are adapted both II R EASON AND EVOLUTION to the particular facts which he knows and to a great many other facts he does not and cannot know. And this adaptation to the general circumstances that surround him is brought about by his observance of rules which he has not designed and often does not even knovv explicitly, although he is able to honour them in action.Or, to put this differently, our adaptation to our environment does not consist only, and perhaps not even chiefly, in an insight into the relations between cause and effect, but also in our actions being governed by rules adapted to the kind of world in which we live, that is, to circumstan ces which we are not aware of and which yet determine the pattern of our successful actions. Complete rationality of action in the Cartesian sense demands complete knowledge of all the relevant facts. A designer or engineer needs all the data and full power to control or manipulate them if he is to organize the material objects to produce the intended result. But the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can possibly know. And our whole civilization in consequence rests, and must rest, on our believing rnuch that we cannot know to be true in the Cartesian sense. What we must ask the reader to keep constantly in mind throughout this book, hen, is the fact of the necessary and irremediable ignorance on everyone's part of most of the particular facts which determine the actions of all the several members of human society. This may at first seem to be a fact so obvious and incontestable as hardly to deserve mention, and still less to require proof. Ye t the result of not constantly stressing it is that it is only too readily forgotten. This is so mainly because it is a very inconvenient fact which makes both our attempts to explain and our attempts to influence intelligently the processes of society very much more difficult, and which places severe limits on what we can say or do about them. There exists therefore a great temptation, as a first approximation, to begin with the assumption that we know everything needed for full explanation or control.This provisional assumption is often treated as something of little consequence which can later be dropped without much effect on the conclusions. Yet this necessary ignorance of most of the particulars which enter the order of a Great Society is the source of the central problem of all social order and the false assumption by which it is provisionally put aside is mostly never explicitly abandoned but merely conveniently forgotten. The argument then proceeds as if that ignorance did not matter. 12 R EASON AND EVOLUTION The fact of our irrcrnediable ignorance of most of the particular facts which determine the processes of society is, however, the reason why most social institutions have taken the form they actually have.To talk about a society about vvhich either the observer or any of its members knows all the particular facts is to talk about something wholly different from anything vhich has ever existcda society in which lnost of vhat ve find in our society vould not and could not exist and vhich, if it ever occurred, vould possess properties ve cannot even imagine. I have discussed the importance of our necessary ignorance of the concrete facts at some length in an earlier book 8 and will emphasize its central importance here mainly by stating it at the head of the vhole exposition. But there are several points vhich require re-statement or elaboration. In he first instance, the incurable ignorance of everyone which I am speaking is the ignorance of partic ular facts which are or will become knovn to somebody and thereby affect the vhole structure of society. rrhis structure of human activities constantly adapts itself, and functions through adapting itself, to millions of facts which in their entirety are not known to anybody. The significance of this process is most obvious and Tas at first stressed in the economic field. As it has been said, ‘the economic life of a non -socialist society consists of millions of relations or flows between individual firms and households. Ve can establish certain theorems about them, but vve can never observe all. 9 The insight into the significance of our institutional ignorance in the economic sphere, and into the methods by vhich ve have learnt to overcome this obstacle, vas in fact the starting point 10 for those ideas which in the present book arc systelnatically applied to a much wider field. It will be one of our chief contentions that most of the rules of conduct vhich govern our action s, and lnost of the institutions which arise out of this regularity, are adaptations to the impossibility of anyone taking conscious account of all the particular facts which enter into the order of society. vVe shall see, in particular, that the possibility of justice rests on this necessary limitation of our factual knowledge, and that insight into the nature of justice is therefore denied to all those constructivists  ·ho habitually argue on the assulnption of omniscience.Another consequence of this basic fact vhich must be stressed here is that only in the small groups of primitive society can collaboration betveen the members rest largely on the circumstance that at anyone moment they will know more or less the same particular 13 R EASON AND EVOLUTION circulnstances. SOl1le wise men 111ay be better at interpreting the immediately perceived circumstances or at remembering things in rClnote places unkndvvn to the others. But the concrete events vhich the individuals encounter i n their daily pursuits will be very much the same for all, and they will act together because the events they know and the objectives at which they aim are more or less the same.The situation is wholly different in the Great 11 or Open Society where millions of men interact and where civilization as we know it has developed. Econon1ics has long stressed the ‘division of labour' which such a situation involves. But it has laid much less stress on the fragmentation of knowledge, on the fact that each Inember of society can have only a small fraction of the knowledge possessed by all, and that each is therefore ignorant of most of the facts on which the working of society rests. Yet it is the utilization of much more knowledge than anyone can possess, and therefore the fact that each moves within a coherent structure most of whose deterlninants are unknown to him, that constitutes the distinctive feature of all advanced civilizations.In civilized society it is indeed not so much the greater knowledge that the individual can acquire, as the greater benefit he receives from the knovledge possessed by others, which is the cause of his ability to pursue an infinitely wider range of ends than merely the satisfaction of his most pressing physical needs. Indeed, a ‘civilized' individual may be very ignorant, more ignorant than many a savage, and yet greatly benefit from the civilization